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Foreword

It is a great pleasure for the Naval War College to publish Admiral J. Paul
Reason's Sailing New Seas as the thirteenth in our series of Newport Papers. The
purpose of this series, now in its eighth year, is to bring significant topics of
national and maritime interest to the attention of a select group of readers.
This Newport paper presents the ideas of one of the Navy's most senior lead
ers. Admiral Reason's topic is the course the United States Navy should steer in
the "typhoon of change" characterizing today's and tomorrow's world. He
begins by describing what the technological, managerial, and social hurricane of
the Information Age means for warriors who go to sea. He then addresses, in
general terms and in specifics, the response such an upheaval requires. W hile ac
knowledging the traditions that made the Navy great, Admiral Reason proposes
a new way to think about the fleet as a whole, one that discards the "industr ial
age model" in favor of the "flight deck paradigm" of a high-performance
organization operating at the edge of chaos. He concludes by stressing the im
portance of rapid adaptability to the Navy's paramount measure of perform
ance-warfighting.
This is an insightful blending of the implications of the "trans-industrial age"
to future warfare, the criticality of data, the relevance of an extraordinar y naval
model of leadership, and the requirement for a new mind-set in the United
States Navy. It is a brief essay, because the author recognizes that quickness and
individual initiative are far more important than "top-down direction" and "the
voice of experience" in readying today's Navy for tomorrow's challenges. "The
task at hand," he writes, "is to lever the Navy from the Industrial Age to the
trans-industrial age, using data-based arguments to increase the efficiency and
quickness with which it accomplishes its missions."
I invite the reader to embark with Admiral Reason for a high-speed sortie
into the future.

Robert S. Wood
Dean of Naval Warfare Studies

Preface

We in the Navy of the United States are anchored in the strong holding
ground of o ur successful past, yet already we feel and see the leading indicators of
a stor m that threatens to wrec k us at o ur hard-won anchorage. We face not a
small squall and some temporary discomfort, but a typhoon more ominous than
any we have encountered since

1944. This time it is a typhoon of c hange. N ow is

not the moment for backward-loo king nostalgia, timid inaction, nervous knee
jerk reactions , or mere hope. We must weigh anchor, pick the right course, and
do all the difficult thi ngs necessary to sail onward at best speed, within the
typhoo n , through new and uncharted seas.
America is the land of opportunity and transformation-it thrives on both.
Naturally, American Sailors are used to change and excel at it. The Naval Serv
ices led the way in steam, ironclads, carrier aviatio n , amphibious warfare , nuclear
power, and sea-based missiles. To preserve our naval preeminence , we must c on
tinue to be at the forefront of innovation and adaptation.
The p urpose of this Newport Paper is to stimulate thinking, discussion, and
new approaches within the Navy. It is meant to b e a primer for every Sailor of
new seas. Not an academic work, it is more fir mly rooted in my own observa
tions and pe rceptions than in the scholarly work of others. Some of the unusual
conclusions presented here grew out of wide-ranging and spirited discussions
held among the leaders of the Atlantic and Pacific Fleets in the spring and sum
mer of

1997.

Welcome aboard.
Make all preparations for getting underway.
Rig for high winds and heavy seas.
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The dogmas of the quiet past, are inadequate to the stormy
present. The occasion is piled high with difficulty, and we
must rise with the occasion. As our case is new, so we must
think anew, and act anew. We must disenthrall ourselves, and
then we shall save our country.
Annual Message to
Congress, December 1, 1862

- Abraham Lincoln,

If we first know where we are, and whither we are tending, we
could then better judge what to do, and how to do it.

- Abraham Lincoln, Republican State
ConlJention, Springfield, Illinois,
June 16,1858

Part One

... where we are, and whither we are tending ...

A Time of Change

� are faced with something new and profoundly different .... The world is chang
ing in ways both fundamental andJrom our perspective, almost incomprehensible.

-William R. Brody, President,Johns Hopkins University

E

MINENT SCHOLARS AND FUTURISTS hold that the entire world, par
ticularly the United States, is in an era of rapid and radical change, pro
found and thoroughgoing change that has never before been quite so rapid and
radical as it is now. Take a good look around: sober reflection indicates that the
prophets of change are right.
Many of these pundits see the previous transition from agr icultural to indus
trial societies as a slow-motion example of what the world is currently going
through. The development of the Industrial Age started very slowly, accelerated
to a rapid pace during the nineteenth century, then eased to a more measured
pace in the twentieth century. Now another transition is taking place as the
world hastens from an industrial to a trans- or post-industrial era, known popu
larly as the "Information Age." The present shift began slowly, but is moving
quickly today, far more quickly than the former transition.
Our intellects and our institutions (e.g., schools, churches, businesses, govern
ments, armed services) have developed and matured in the late Industrial Age,
the twentieth-century period of gradually increasing industrial complexity. We
perceive the world around us through Industrial Age lenses. We think and speak
in Industrial Age terms. We educate, organize, and govern ourselves on the basis
of Industrial Age patterns. We fight with Industrial Age weapons in Industrial
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Age ways. But now Industrial Age institutions, concepts, and terms are rapidly
becoming or are already outmoded and irrelevant, while different organizations ,
ideas, and vocabular ies are speedily developing to handle the realities of the new
era. Like the movement from the agr icultural era to the Industr ial Age, but to a
*
greater degree and at a faster rate, the trans-industrial period is transforming al
most every area of human endeavor, including agriculture, industry, communi
cations, commerce, government ... and war.
This "jump-shift," this "radical bend," this "new age" is leading to wholly
new ways of fighting (new ways of producing wealth lead to new ways of de
stroying it). Warfare systems based on old ways and concepts can be outmaneu
vered and neutralized by systems based on new ways and concepts. Bravery and
speed and surprise will be just as important as they were at Trafalgar and Midway,
but the weapons and tactics will be different.
The urgent

question is this:

How is the mighty

United States

Navy, with its minds and organiza
tions deeply rooted in the mature It!
dustrial Age, to change quickly at!d

Not only will the unimaginable happen,

it

will happen Jaster than you can imagine.
Change comes hardest to those with the deep
est traditions.
-Mario Marino, founder of

tfficiet!tly into a Navy that Cat! fight

Legent Corporation.

and wit! it! a dpzamic, trans-industrial
age?
Aye, mates, there's the rub.

The Change Machine
Incremental programmatic and organizational adjustments, more money, and
improved Industrial Age weapon systems and platforms will not be enough to
ensure that the U.S. Navy remains the preeminent navy. The usual responses (no
matter how sophisticated) to variations in the late Industrial Age environment
will not suffice, because the world has profoundly changed and is changing still.
A new age calls for a new change machine. Metaphorically speaking , a fulcrum
and lever, and the wisdom to use them effectively, are needed to move the Navy
into the next era. (Should fulcrum and lever prove to be too slow, then powder
and shot should not be spared.)
*

Many different terms are used to describe the "new age," such as "post-industrial age," "information age,"

"Third Wave," and "knowledge age." There are objections to each. This Paper seeks to avoid those
objections by coining and using a new term, "trans-industrial age," which refers to an age in transition from
the Industrial Age to something else. It is left to a future generation to find a more precise name for the present
era of change.
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The fulcr um consists of the mission and mission-related tasks. What must
the Navy be able to do, and how swiftly ? In what environment, against what
threats? What tasks must be accomplished to execute the mission in the time re
quired? The Navy must answer those questions, then

continually and rapidly update

the answers.
The lever is data. There was a time when enough resources were available to
satisfY nearly every national military need and most national military desires. It
used to be that ser vice-specific arguments, decorated with soft numbers and
buttressed by personal exper ience
and well-ear ned reputation, car
ried the day in budgetary debates.

Does it contain any abstract reasoning con
cerning quantity or number? No. Does it con

No longer. Now the Navy needs

tain any experimental reasoning concerning

other, more

matter of fact and existence? No. Commit it

cogent

arguments,

built upon hard, objectively meas
ured, incontrovertible data. Credi

then to the flames: For it can contain nothing
but sophistry and illusion.

-David Hume, 18'" century

ble, accurate data that is relevant to
warfare missions and tasks consti-

tutes the lever with which the Navy can be moved into the new age. Indeed,
such data is the only workable lever for the present and future world (see pages

58-63).*

Yet it is not enough simply to possess the tools for change. To use the lever
and fulcr um cor rectly, wisdom is needed-wisdom which stems from a thor
ough understanding of the Navy's missions, mission-related tasks, capabilities,

and readiness.t From this wisdom must flow appropriate warfare concepts and
theory. With this wisdom the Navy can deter mine what it requires to accom
plish its missions quicker, better, and cheaper. Clearly, missions and mission
related tasks, and the concepts for accomplishing them, must drive the require
+
ments process. And, in tur n, defining the missions and tasks requires an under

standing of the Navy's environment and the threats the Navy can expect in that
environment.

*

By data is meant something more precise than what has usually been called "data"-namely, mere

numbers generated by analyses of questionable relevance and rigor, supported by authoritative voices of
experience. Data is

real

information, derived from accurate, verifiable measurements based on well-defined,

meaningful standards. Numbers are fluff, orten prettily dressed up as "data."
Readiness again raises the issue of data. Evaluation of the Navy's readiness must be based on meaningful,

t

consistently applied, quantifiable measures of effectiveness (see page 62). Current assessments of readiness are

too often inadequate, inaccurate, misleading, or irrelevant.
+ The other way around is illogical and foolish.
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The Navy's Environment
People often talk about shaping environments, but it is an inescapable fact that
the technological environment shapes people and their societies (Karl Marx was
1
right on that score). It is doing so today, probably faster and more thoroughly
than even the most astute observers realize. Computer technology is trans
for ming commerce, finance, social relations, and the armed ser vices, to name
just a few, at an incredible pace. And the transformation is just beginning,
steadily accelerating with no slowdown in sight.
Infor mation can now be acquired with astonishing ease: an individual can ef
fortlessly, cheaply, and quickly gather information that had previously been diffi
cult to access, or had not been available at all. Information can also be distr ibuted
and analyzed much faster than before, and it can be manipulated and used in
ways never before imagined, to accomplish tasks not thought possible. The
World W ide Web is a case in point. Growing at an exponential rate and evolving
rapidly in complexity, the Web is remolding whole sectors of society: commerce,
finance, communications, education-the list goes on.
These new information capabilities catalyze the development and refinement
of other capabilities, rendering older ones unnecessary or ir relevant. W ith regard
to the Navy, the infor mation technology explosion makes possible (list not ex
haustive):
•

The manufacture of more precise and more lethal weapons, with a con
sequent decrease in requirements for large amounts of on-hand ammu
nition

•

The ability to incorporate into weapons hitherto unfathomable ad
vances in maneuverability, speed, guidance, and range, thus alleviating
the need to optimize those qualities in launching platforms

•

Decentralized, quicker, and better combat decision making through the
use of data distribution systems, expert systems, and redundant commu
nications

•

A diminished need for the Navy to have weapons of mass destruction
(WMD), together with the development of more effective defenses
against the use of WMD by others

•

The distr ibution and dispersal of combat power, with attendant reduc
tions in dependence on foreign bases and in the number of military as
sets that are large, tempting targets for weapons of mass destruction

•

Dramatic reductions in warship manning

•

Improved efficiency in the generation and use of energy
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All of the foregoing sounds wonderful; however, lest the Navy be dazzled by
the promise of technology, certain caveats must be kept in mind to maintain
clarity of vision. The technology sword cuts both ways: technology and infor
mation are widely distributed and easily accessible, worldwide. With the increase
in technological distribution and diversity, uncertainty likewise increases. The
Navy must learn to deal with greater levels of tactical, operational, and strategic
uncertainty. Furthermore, new technologies bring new vulnerabilities, usually
unknown or unanticipated. The double-edged sword of information availability
obliges the Navy to reexamine its plans and tactics continually in order to iden
tify and then eliminate or minimize its vulnerabilities. Lastly, the increasing
speed of change makes it necessary for the Navy to quicken its response cycle radi
cally in all its activities and functions, else it runs the risk of being outmaneu
vered, frustrated, and defeated.
Developments in the technological environment are profoundly affecting the
international environment. New technologies are altering the ways in which
wealth is produced and distributed, which in turn is causing rapid (and poten
tially dangerous) social, economic, and political change. International friction,
fragmentation, shifting alliances, and new power relationships ensue. Economic
competition is intensifying on a global scale, accompanied by the emergence of
multinational companies having no fir m commitments to any one nation and
exerting considerable influence on world trade.
Particularly relevant to the Navy is the growing vulnerability of free use of
the seas. While growing more vital with increasing worldwide dependence on
international trade, free navigation of the seas, already made vulnerable by cheap
and low-technology weapons, is becoming even more vulnerable with the ap
pearance of new and dispersed technology that enables the swift development of
new weapons and ways of using them.
For reasons related to the impacts of technology, the political complexion of
the world changed radically in the 1980s. The history has been recounted be
fore, but it bears review. The world in which most Americans matured was po
larized by the United States and the Soviet Union . Dejure or defacto, most other
countries aligned themselves with one superpower or the other, as their national
interests dictated. The Soviet Union and the United States used cultural ties,
economic ties, diplomacy, and raw power (more or less gently applied) to gain
and retain the commitment of these countries. Friendly persuasion was usually
used with those countries who were in positions affording some semblance of
neutrality and who could play one pole against the other.
That world no longer exists. The Soviet Union is gone and has not yet been
replaced by a major power that has the ability and desire to compete with the
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United States in a traditional (Industrial Age) military sense. American popular
culture (not to be confused with values and mores) is spreading throughout the
world and, aided by modern communications, is rapidly becoming the domi
nant and pervasive world culture, even in countries whose leadership would
strongly prefer otherwise. Most emerging and developing economies depend
very much on access to the American market, relying on sales in that market to
provide cash needed to fund modernization. For speedy development, often fa
cilitated by ways to leapfrog expensive Industrial Age infrastructure, such econo
mies also turn to technologies that are most highly advanced and available in the
United States.
In short, the Cold War situation, in which the United States needed the good
will and cooperation of other nations more than they needed that of the United
States, has been reversed. Over time, the United States will probably adjust its in
ternational relationships accordingly. However, it is judicious to realize that the
current situation is just as transient as the Cold War was-history confirms the
impermanence of political arrangements.
On the domestic front: although the people of the United States support a
defense establishment sufficient for current needs, changes in relative economic
strength and in domestic political and economic priorities may lead to erosion
of support in the future. That handwriting is already on the wall and has been for
many years . Rapid changes in technology, international politics, and interna
tional economics will lead to much greater uncertainty (and political wrangling)
in determining how best to provide for the national defense. Changing and
widely varying social and educational standards, combined with economic de
mands for trained and disciplined workers in the civilian workplace, will render
it difficult for the armed forces of the United States to attract as many qualified
people as they do now.

The Threat
This is not the place for a detailed listing of destabilizing forces in the world,
but it is worth noting that rapid change frequently causes social, economic, and
political instability. Instability is not a necessary consequence of rapid change,
but it is a likely outcome. Traditional social structures, including family and re
ligious structures, are often severely traumatized by sudden, swift change. The
ensuing shock and aftershocks those structures undergo can be extremely stress
ful for the members of any nation or organization. Extreme social stress leads of
ten in turn to extreme (radical) behavior. In the current state of affairs, all states
and organizations, however modern, are subject to the risk of change-induced
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instability. Moreover, the international situation is becoming so fluid that any
state or organization can become an ally, and any can become an enemy (or an
unhelpful neutral).
It would be dangerously imprudent for the militar y and political leaders of
the United States to think that because American ar med forces appear to be
stronger than any others, they are also smarter than others are and have no criti
cal vulnerabilities. Such arrogant opinion can become fatal delusion, for there
are many asymmetric threats, and more are coming. Low-tech, self-sacrificial,
asymmetric, unconventional (including but not limited to chemical and biologi
cal weapons)-these adjectives describe the kinds of threats that U.S. forces are
unaccustomed to countering. Dangerous already in themselves, such threats are
actually more sinister because they are stealthy: they do not appear on late-In
dustrial Age mental or institutional radar screens. As an institution, the Navy
tends not to see these kinds of threats because they are hidden by ingrained para
digms of cognition and thought.

*

It is unlikely that any hostile organization or state will challenge the U.S. Navy
with aircraft carriers, nuclear submarines, or amphibious task forces. That course
would be foolishly playing to American strengths. Rather, it is far more likely that
enemies will look for, find, and exploit vulnerabilities. Yet-and this may seem in
tuitively obvious, but is worth stating plainly-U.S. forces are well prepared to
counter expected threats, unprepared to counter unexpected or unimagined
threats. Preparedness of that kind is not enough. The list of real threats which the
next Navy and the Navy-after-next must be ready to meet should be expanded to
include all those present and future threats for which today's Navy was not built.
Weapons of mass destruction rank high on the list of threats to be addressed.
Some WMD, such as nuclear weapons, can be developed only by advanced in
dustrial economies; nonetheless, these WMD can still be wielded by anyone able
to buy or steal them and move them to a target area (a difficult task, but not im
possible). Other WMD do not require a highly evolved industrial base for their
development, and they are relatively easy to transport. These include chemical
and, especially, biological weapons. If the methods of their acquisition and em
ployment are imaginative enough, weapons of mass destruction may constitute
asymmetric threats, circumventing defenses devised against them. Moreover, al
though WMD are reserved primar ily for use against very expensive, massive, or
massed targets,t they can also be used against discrete (point) targets.

*

The histories of medicine and physical science are replete with examples of how deeply rooted.

authoritative patterns of thought concealed---and were later changed or discredited by-realities later

confirmed by experiment. The histories of naval and land warfare are no
That is, targets inviting targeting by weapons of mass destruction.

t
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One asymmetry difficult to account for is the non-state. The United States
normally considers other states as potential enemies. However, given the wide
distribution of technology and knowledge, and the capabilities of well-honed
terrorist and smuggling organizations, future enemies may not be other states
and nations . Troublesome questions then arise: How is the United States to
counter non-state threats? Can a state declare war against a non-state? What if
the non-state is sheltered within the territory of another state? The rise of so
phisticated, powerful, and hostile non-states suggests that finding answers to
these and related questions should become a paramount national priority.
Adding further complexity to the issue of asymmetric threats is the changing
status of the rules of war. Some parties seek new rules (e.g., the prohibition of
land mines), others recognize no rules. New or newly radicalized states may not
observe the rules of war, claiming that the old rules unfairly put them at a disad
vantage or that the rules of war do not apply to them because their situation is
unique and merits exception. That has happened many times in the twentieth
century; it would be wise to expect it to occur in the twenty-first . Even more
vexing is the fact that non-states are not parties to the Geneva Conventions nor
are they members of the United Nations. Hence they usually do not regard
international law or the r ules of war as obligatory.
The question is, What to do? What are the concepts for protecting the nation
against the threats discussed above? What will the Navy's tactics be? No one
knows. What will the Rules of Engagement be? No one knows. Do the United
States and the other nations of the world need new rules? Probably, but even the
U.S. in its leadership role has not given that matter adequate constructive
thought.
In a nutshell, the problem is unpredictability. The Navy and the nation must rec
ognize and face the existence of exceedingly high, and rising, levels of uncer
tainty. In the per iod from

1947 through 1990, the crystal ball was relatively clear;

now it is distressingly cloudy. It is just not at all easy today to peer into the future
and make reliable predictions. The litany of unknowns is daunting:
•

No one knows who the enemy will be.

•

No one knows if the enemy will be a state or an organization.

•

No one knows what weapons and technologies the enemy will have
and how they will be used.

•

No one knows when the enemy will strike.

•

No one knows what the enemy's objectives will be.

•

No one knows what tactics the enemy will use.

•

No one knows what rules, if any, the enemy will obser ve.

•

No one knows which rules the Navy will be allowed to use.

10
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No one knows. But inaction is not
Necessity is the mother of invention.
an option, especially for the Navy.
-(Proverb)
Ways must be found to deal with
chronic and extreme uncertainty;
Necessity is a ferocious teacher.
-Michel de Montaigne, 16" century
with the inability to predict anything
in the long term; with radical, rapid,
pervasive change; and with much more limited budgets. It is necessary that this
be done, and the sooner the better, for later is likely to be too late.
The Response: Become Quicker, Cheaper, and Better

The United States struggled for forty-five years to create a defense establishment that
could 4fectively and efficiently prepare for and wage a conflict such as World J%r II
or a possible global clash with the Soviets. Hopefully the Pentagon will not take as
long to reorganize for the security challenges r.if the post- Cold J%r era, in which or
ganizational adaptability and quickness are major assets.
-Senator Sam Nunn
A

dynamic world requires a defense organization that can prepare quickly for a wide
range of challenges.
-Senator Sam Nunn

The new strategic imperative is quickness. Survival of the fittest is now survival
of the fleetest-Jack Tar be nimble,Jack Tar be quick. To become quicker, three
things are required: flexibility, agility, and speed.
Flexibility is the ability to respond to change. Maximizing flexibility demands
distributed information, a decentralized decision structure, simple decision rules,
and mission-based orders. The flight deck of an aircraft carrier is a perfect
small-scale example of a flexible organization (see pages 22-25). Its crew is com
posed of well-trained, sharply focused, mutually supporting personnel. It is a
supple, highly responsive, flat organization. Information is widely distributed,
and there are redundant methods of distribution. The flight deck operates on the
basis of simple decision rules, with authority for action placed at action levels,
dependent upon position, skill, and information rather than rank.
Agility involves alertness, the ability to move swiftly and easily in any direc
tion, and the capacity to change direction on short notice. The agile organiza
tion is flat: it has no tall, vertical, thick-walled "stovepipes." The agile, flat, broadly
dispersed organization is quick to aggregate whatever forces are needed for
emergent missions. In such an organization, decision making is decentralized,
11
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with decisions made quickly by the persons at the point of the spear-they have
the most to gain or lose. Information is widely distributed and accessible , not
tightly controlled and compartmented, with all necessary and relevant information
(not all information, merely) passed in digestible form to decision makers at the
cutting edge of mission execution.

*

As to speed, fighter pilots have it right: speed is life. The Navy must be able to
move faster than any potential enemy, and not just in its fighter aircraft. It must
be the fastest in developing and fielding new technology; in developing the tac
tics that use new technology; and in developing measures to protect new vulner
abilities. The Navy must be able to redirect its effort and direction much more
rapidly than anyone else. The Navy's cycle times and combat decision time must
be made so short that no one can turn within the Navy's wake-its information
and decision loops must be too fast and tight to counter. Operational secur ity
must come primarily from speed of action (which includes speed of decision)
rather than from information classification systems.
The Navy must not only become quicker, it must also do things cheaper. The
days of plenty are long gone, and yearning after them or trying to recover them is
futile. Expanding entitlement expenditures, economic dislocations due to forces
of change, increasing global competitiveness, and the absence of clear and pres
ent danger will all serve to decrease the share of American resources allocated to
defense. Certainly the Navy will save money by becoming quicker, for time is
money (spent in salaries, fuel usage, wear and tear, inventory storage,lost oppor
tunities, inefficient use of capital investment). One conspicuous imperative is the
reduction of waste: wasted time, wasted talent, wasted people, wasted opportuni
ties, wasted capital investments, and wasted fuel, parts, food, etc. A related task is
the removal of unnecessary duplication in mission-tasking and organizational
structure.
Everything the Navy does must and can be done faster and cheaper-but not
shoddily. Faster and cheaper do not necessarily imply worse, and the times de
mand that the Navy do things better; quality of performance must improve, con
tinuously. The Navy is justly proud of its ability to do things well. That is good .
However, in naval technology and warfare the Navy has been so much better
than its competitors that it expects the margin of excellence to continue. That is
bad. Those who have been at sea on the ships of other excellent navies know
that in some regards the preeminence of the u.s. Navy is already being chal
lenged in quality though not (yet) in quantity. Given the worldwide free flow of
information and rapid rates of technological and economic change, the Navy

*

The last two sentences of this paragraph identify the hallmarks ofUflat organization" in the context of this

paper: namely, decentralized decision making and timely flow of relevant information.
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cannot assume that it will remain the undisputed heavyweight naval champion.
It must instead work constantly to stay in shape, lear n new moves, and become
quicker than all contenders. The Navy must keep its focus on the

correct missions

and on the ability to adapt and change.
W hile the Navy grows quicker, cheaper, and better, it ought also to become
more dispersed. Weapons of mass destruction are the ultimate Industrial Age
weapons, and the Navy must be able to deal with them. One method of coun
tering WMD is to eliminate or hide concentrations of wealth or power which
would invite their attention. To that end, the effectiveness of WMD may be
greatly reduced by segmenting and dispersing naval forces. Moder n technology
facilitates that task and also enables the control and assembly ("mix-and-match")
of dispersed forces and weaponry as the situation demands.

§§§
A final thought: Homeports are indeed homes. Despite rumors to the con
trary, the Navy and the other ar med forces are not isolated societies. In fact, mili
tary and civilian communities are becoming more closely intertw ined, to the
extent that dispersed units of the ar med forces take on the complexions of their
host communities, in varying degrees. The armed forces need more effective
representation in civilian communities to enhance the mutual benefits of close
military-civilian relationships. The military is already relying ver y much on the
material and human resources of civilian communities; increasingly it is drawing
its ideas from them.
Gone are the days when the militar y led civilian society in technology and
organizational ability. The military now has more to lear n than it has to teach. It
can learn valuable lessons from successful American companies in many areas,
including:
•

Rapid , timely, and economic worldwide distribution of material, information, and services

•

Decentralized management of operations around the world

•

Customer service

•

Reliability of equipment

•

Advanced manufactur ing techniques

•

Encouraging innovative leadership

•

Recruiting premium talent

•

Rapidly redirecting organizational focus

•

Foster ing organizational vigor

•

Networking and information management

13

The Newport Pap ers
•

Supplier integration

•

Data collection and analysis

•

Food services

•

Dynamic incorporation of new and advanced technologies

Many citizens in the civilian sector are ready, willing, and able to teach the
Navy. T hey share the sentiment expressed by the director of human resources at
Solar Turbines: "It's our Navy too, you know."
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Part Two

... what to do ...

A

N ENVIRONMENT CHARACTERIZED by rapid change and chronic,

extreme levels of uncertainty is an environment on the edge of chaos. It is

a great place to be in, because it is where the action is, where the opportunities
are, and where the future will be defined. As discussed previously, such an envi
ronment already surrounds the Navy. Responding to it effectively-i.e., becom
ing quicker, cheaper, and better-requires consideration of:
•

The Navy's essential capabilities

•

Operational command and control

•

Management of the Navy as a whole

•

The Navy's force structure (ships, aircraft, and submarines)

•

Fleet organization (to be discussed in depth)

•

Warfare community representation and leadership

The following sections discuss these matters in the sequence above. Although
the sections may be read independently, it must be remembered that they are in
terrelated

Essential Navy Capabilities
The most essential Navy capabilities are sea control, forward presence, and
power projection. These capabilities are not new, but in the current climate of
change their characteristics and relative priority must be reevaluated.

Sea

Control

The American economy relies heavily on international trade. In fact, all the
economies of the world, including those of the developing nations, and all
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multinational companies depend for their prosperity upon uninterrupted
worldwide commerce. World trade is vital and growing in importance; there is
really no such thing as an isolated economy anymore. Although the interna
tional economy increasingly includes electronic financial exchanges and traffic
in knowledge labor, it still depends for the most part upon the exchange of raw
mater ials, product components, and finished goods. That trade requires free use
of the seas, currently guaranteed to the world by the United States Navy, cour
tesy of the American taxpayer.
Over the course of the twentieth century, the U.S. Navy has become the
dominant sea power. In the latter half of the century, the United States has, in a
spirit of enlightened self-interest, willingly used its Navy to maintain the "free
dom of the seas." Indeed, freedom of the seas has not been significantly chal
lenged for over fifty year s only because of America's power and will to maintain
it. All multinational corporations and peaceful nations have consequently en
joyed free use of the seas for legitimate trade. Although they may assume that
freedom of the seas will continue, it is only prudent for the U.S. Navy to assume
that it will not-at least, not without challenge. Despite the recent historical rec
ord, freedom of the seas can be challenged, and, in a dynamic and uncertain
world rife with technological, political, economic, and social change, a challenge
is inevitable.

Freedom if the seas is the most important product if the United States Navy. It is the
preeminent economic gift of the American people to the rest of the world.
Without it, world trade and world economies collapse.

Sea control is therefore the Jundamental

capability

oj the

Navy.

There is no forward presence on
the sea without control of the
sea. There is no power projec

In fact, at the core of us. security require
ments lies one prerequisite--sea control. Us.
milita ry strategy is based on forward presence
and power projection--maintaining a pres
in key regions and, when necessary, de

tion from the sea without con

ence

trol

ploying and sustaining sea, land, and air

of the

sea. There is

no

initiation or support of littoral
warfare from the sea without
control of the seas between the
United States and the engaged

forces overseas. If we cannot command the seas
and the airspace above them, we cannot proj
ect power to command or influence events
ashore; we cannot deter; we cannot shape the
security environment.

-Admiral Jay Johnson, Chief of Naval

littoral. Sea control is absolutely

necessary,

the

thing

Operations

without

which all other naval missions,
and most national missions, precar iously r isk catastrophic failure. It is impos
sible to overemphasize this point.
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Forward Presence
There are four methods of maintaining forward naval presence, and all four
can be employed simultaneously: forward basing, deployment, cruising, and
sprinting. Forward basing involves and is limited by political obligations and vul
nerabilities. W here these are not too serious and present few impediments, for
ward basing is a quite effective and efficient way to maintain presence.

Deployment is the scheme the Navy has used since the 1950s. The u.s. Navy is
well practiced at it-quite expert, really. However, deployment suffers from a se
rious drawback: it is expensive in terms of time, consumption of capital naval in
vestment (i.e., ships and aircraft), fuel, and outlays to fund current-year
operations.

Cru is ing can be thought of as an "infesting the oceans" variation on the Ma

rine Corps concept of "infesting the battlefield." The u.s. Navy cruised exten
sively earlier in this century, even after World War II. Cruising is not practiced
now, but with today's shipbuilding, weapons, and information technologies it is a
feasible, easily implemented method. It may be perfectly appropriate to the
"Navy-after-next."
Cruising can use large numbers of relatively inexpensive, slow, simple, lightly
manned, self-sufficient, high-endurance ships spread over the oceans in a broad
network. Such ships can be armed with missiles (offensive and defensive) and
carry combat troops, two helicopters, and inflatable boats. Notional cruises are
about five months long, "round the world," with adequate liberty and "show the
flag" port calls. Cruising units can be aggregated to whatever extent necessary to
counter emergent threats. A network of cruising warships is readily expandable
and can be the mobilization focus of the Naval Reserve. It can augment or be
augmented by deployed or sprinting forces.
Relatively junior personnel man the cruising ships, and they respond to mis
sion exigencies in accordance with simple decision rules in which they are thor
oughly drilled. Cascaded expert systems support the crews, utilizing both locally
generated data and "demand-pulled" or "command-pushed" data from remote
locations.
Lastly, forward presence can also be achieved through sprinting--i.e., moving
forces at high speed from bases in the United States to areas of crisis. Of the four
methods of maintaining presence, sprinting has the least deterrent effect. To ex
ert an early influence, U.S. forces must be visible in a region

as, not after, political

unrest begins to deteriorate towards crisis. Another drawback is that sprinting
naval forces may frequently lack staying power; high-speed mobile forces can
easily "outrun" their logistics "tail." Still, sprinting (or surging) is currently the
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option usually exercised in the face of rapidly developing crises. In the absence
of prearranged bilateral agreements, naval surges are attractive courses of action
because of the self-sufficiency of afloat expeditionary forces.

Power Projection
Like the other services, the Navy has placed a premium on power projection
since the beginning of the Cold War. The United States did not think that the
Soviet Union had developed the capability to invade and occupy the American
continent. However, the U.S. was very concerned that the Soviet Union would
invade and occupy other countries. Also of concern was that the U.S.S.R. would use
its massive strategic strike capability to neutralize the power of the United States. To
deter Soviet military action against the U.S. and its allies, America developed a credi
ble power projection capability able to be used against the Soviet Union. Since the
U.S.S.R. was generally not considered to seriously threaten the ability of the United

States to maintain freedom of the seas, the U.S. Navy emphasized power projection
over sea control--sea control efforts were focused primarily on countering Soviet
submarines.
Now that the Soviet Union is defunct, it is time for the Navy to reconsider its
power projection role, beginning with the obvious, fundamental question: "W hy
must the Navy be able to project power?" In brief, the Navy requires the ability
to project power in order to support three missions:
•
•

Sea control
The establishment of a foothold on foreign territory, thereby enabling
the fullest projection of Army and Air Force power deeply and broadly
against an enemy

•

Strategic operations and deterrence

·

Paramount among these three missions is sea control (because it must precede
the other t wo): controlling the seas to maintain free navigation by the United
States and friendly countries and to deny the seas to countries hostile to the na
tion or its friends. Sea control requires the will and capability to neutralize mili
tary power that can challenge free use of the seas. Thus sea control entails the
ability to project power:
•

Against forces on, in, or over the sea

•

Landward in sufficient depth against forces that may be brought to bear
against seagoing commerce or naval forces.

•

The Navy provides ballistic missile submarines and trained crews to STRATCOM, which plans and

directs deterrent patrols and strategic operations.
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Littoral warfare is especially relevant to the first two of the three supported
missions-controlling the seas and gaining footholds on foreign te rritory. To
dominate the battle spaces related to these missions, the Navy and Marine Corps
must be able to:
•

Counter hostile forces brought to bear against the battle spaces

•

Isolate and interdict the battle spaces as necessary u n til the power p ro
vided by the o ther services can be applied

•

Supplement the isolation and interdic tion e fforts of the other services
once they are established i n theater.

Command and Contro l
Responsive command and c on trol is an e s s e n tial part of s e a c ontrol , for
ward p res e n c e , and p ower p roj e c ti o n . That s e e m s o bvi o u s , b u t the key wo rd
is responsive. B y that criterio n , I n du s trial Age systems of highly s t r u c tu re d a n d
c e n tralize d c ommand and c o n t rol a re inadequate at the e dge of c h a o s . T h ey
a re t o o slow, too vulne rable , i n s u ffi c i e ntly agi l e , and u n able to c o ll e c t a n d
p ro c e s s all the relevan t info r mation t h ey n e e d . T h e evolving e nviro n m e n t re 
quires d e c e n tralized c o mmand supported by timely flows of relevant i n fo r 
·
matio n .
Missi o n c o mmanders must t h o rou ghly u n d e r s t a n d mission
obj e c tive s and must s h arply fo cus o n miss i o n exe c u ti o n . T h ey must be sup
p o rted with p e rtinent info r ma tion p rovided fro m all sources via red u n da n t
delivery systems . Two simple examples of this mode o f o perating a t the e dge
of c h ao s are the use of wire -fre e c o mmunications to support damage c o n trol
efforts and t h e simultaneous u s e of multiple , i n te rconne c te d (aurally and
visually) o b s e rve rs a n d a c tio n p e r s o nnel o n t h e fligh t deck of an airc raft car
rier ( s e e next s e c tion ) .
Mission commanders ought to be equippe d with cascaded expert systems
that feed decision nodes by: 1) consolidating externally received information
with organic input; 2) reducing information to digestible amounts in readily un
derstandable fo rmats . Furthermore, mission commanders should be provided
with, and trained in, the use of simple decision rule s . They can then apply the
rules to c onsolidated information and act accordingly.
N ow, suppose a large-scale version of this decentralized system of command
and control is also the way to run the entire Navy in the future . . . .
•

That is, the evolving environment requires an agile , flat orga nization (see pages 1 1- 1 2 ) .
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Manag ing the Navy of the Future Using a Flight Deck Parad ig m
In an article written several years ago, John Pfeiffer reports on the work of
three professors (University of California, Berkeley) who studie d " high
reliability, complex organizations which, in the throes of adapting to fast
, ,2
changing times, manage to achieve remarkably low failure rates . Primary em
phasis in the article is given to flight operations aboard a Navy aircraft carrier.
Thus, some of what follows is familiar to naval professionals , but all of it merits
close attention.
In the complex and rapidly changing world of a carrier flight deck du ring
flight operations, very complex procedures must be executed quickly and per
fec tly, or c atastrophe results . Information for decision making comes in fast
flowing floods. Scores of decisions and actions must occur nearly simultaneously
and are often followed by torrents of more information and equally urgent deci
sions that likewise allow no margin for uncorrected error.
The flight deck is not unique. Rapid development of technology and ready
availability of large amounts of time-sensitive information are causing many
other organizations and activities (at least in their critical parts) to exhibit similar
characteristics : high speed; high tension and stress; extreme complexity; no toler
ance of uncorrected error; operations at the edge of chaos.
Information demands and flows are increasingly large and fast in all profes
sions and businesses. Huge amounts of informa tion (good and bad, and who
knows which is which?) arrive constantly. Decisions must be made fas ter, and
the impacts of those decisions develop faster. Such is life in the quickly moving
and tu rbulent world.

Vertical (Centralized) Management
The old, Industrial Age organization (there are many such, and the current
Navy organization is one of them) is unsuited to operations at the edge of chaos
and is rapidly becoming obsolete. It is composed of big wheels supported by
staffs of experts; gradations of smaller wheels ; and cogs. * The standard organiza
tion chart shows it well, although most of the cogs do not even show, and the ex
perts-given little real power-are put into small boxes off to the side of the
supported wheels. The Industrial Age organization's vertical decision structure,
with its concentration of power at the top, cannot quickly digest the data and

*

Wheels and cogs are the tenus Pfeiffer uses in his articl e.
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information provided it. As a result, it respo nds too slowly, and too often inap
propriately. By its very nature it is condemned to be inadequately efficient and
effective in the evolving environment.
I n spite of this archaic structure 's inhere nt systemic deficiencies , many o rgani
zatio ns expend considerable effort, and legions of co nsultants earn a good living,
trying to make it work in the new, modern world. Society educates more big
wheels (and then pays them well) because it assumes (out of habit) that more big
whe els can make the thing go. Does the old structure actually work? Ask the
cogs .
The Navy still uses that type of vertical organization for parades and pay, but
should not use it fo r operations at the e dge of disas ter and chaos. The fligh t deck
certainly does not use it. Every pers on on the flight deck is an expert, doing one
task (o r a few tasks) very well. The tasks are significan t i n the most extreme sense:
if don e well, people live ; if done poo rly, pe ople die. Eve ry flight deck c rew mem
ber un derstands that complex, fast-moving, merciless environment, and knows
that eve rybody o n the flight deck is an expert. When speaking as an expert in a
ce rtain area, a crew member-whether officer or seaman-is listened to, even
defe rred to. Expe rts demand t o be heard , and are heard, because they are experts.
F u rthermore, any " c og" acting as an expert can shut down flight operations , and
no officer (not eve n an admiral) will contest the right, obligation, and authority
to do s o. Such behavior is not punished; rather, it is supported, rec ognized, and
rewarded.
There is one important caveat to note : in all organiza ti ons " there tends to be a
chronic gap betwe en ' taskers,' who give orders , and ' operators ,' who must carry
)
them out." For the flight deck and organiza ti o ns analogou s to it, the obvious
conclusion is that taskers should not give operational orders . The key is to train
the operators well and then tell them what to do, but not how to do it. (Actually,
operators need more than good training and a clear mission order. They also
need information, as discussed below. )

Flat (Decentralized) Management
Many o rganizations facing e nvironments and situations similar to those on
the flight deck have assessed requirements and po ssibilities differe ntly. They see
the new technology in infor mati on distribution and p rocessing as an o p portu
nity to take more centralized (tighter) co ntrol of operations. They assume that
with more information from operators in the field, obtained more quickly and
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p rocessed in greater detail, decisions about execution ("how to do it") can be
made, and made b etter, at a c e ntralized c o mmand facili ty.

That assumption is false. Take the flight deck : not all the significant info rma

tion regarding the "beat" of the flight dec k can b e communicated to a decision
maker in the bowels of th e ship. Likewise , the "beat" of the battlefield, in business
or war, cannot be fully c o mmunicated to a decision ma ker-a "big wheel "-at
a headquarters. The smells , the tensions , the noises , the p ulse, the fe el, the even ts
unconsciously seen and recorded peripherally-all these cannot be verbalized or
digitized , trans mitted, and reconstituted accurately, c o mpletely, and quickly
enough .
Experts must make some decisio ns on the scene (actually, many decisions, in
fast-breaking and dangerous situations) . However, no exp e r t can " know it all ."
No exp e rt can make sense of the turbul ent flow of events, in

to to, j ust by looking

at the whole operation-although every expert must have a ge neral u nderstand
ing of it. Areas of exp e rtise, responsibility, and authority must be kep t to a level to
which the expert can be trained and within which the expert can be fully aware
of all important, relevant infor matio n . In other wo rds , every exp ert must be fo
cused o n an asp ect of the chaotic environment small enough to be ordered and
understandable; and the organization mu st recognize e ach expert as the primary
(and, i n s o me cases, absolute) authority within that area, regardless of rank.
The organi zation mu st also acknowledge that even the best-traine d human
can make mistakes if give n defective o r inadequate infor matio n , or if the ability
to recognize and use information is impaired by exhaustio n or overloading.
Therefore, each expert mus t be supported to ensure that app ropriate info r ma
tion is received and p rocessed correctly. Providing p roper informa tion support
to the exp ert sounds like an simple ma tter, but it is actually difficult. Co nsider: if
the exp ert receives conflicting infor mation, which source sho uld b e believed? If
the expert receives more information tha n can b e digested, what war rants im
mediate attention? True, info r mation can be correlated and checked for q u ality
before the exp ert receives it, but then it may arrive too late (actually, it i s

likely to

a rrive too late) .
The solution is to limit input to

the

expert to factual observations,

and-where feasible-to have at least three path s for transmission to the expert.
If multiple paths of transmission are not feasible, o r if the input consists of a n a
lyzed info rmation, then the i np u t sh ould be sent fro m one source. If there is too
much incoming info r mation for the expert to digest , it should be sorted, par
tially analyzed, and then presented by supporting expert systems that can be p ro
grammed and activated at will .
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Flight deck management is the epitome of decentralized management.

It has five sali-

ent, essential properties:
•

Experts are trained to do certain tasks in the desi red way.

•

Experts are given full responsibility and authority to do those tasks .

•

Exp erts are provided the information they need.

•

Experts are depended upon to accomplish their tasks .

•

It is assumed that the experts have done their j obs unless they report
that their j obs canno t be done, or have not been do ne .

Learning from the Flight Deck
The inescapable fact is that in times of rapid change, centralized management does not
work well in a complex, technologically sophisticated society. Does the reader want con
firmati o n ? Ask the old Soviet Politburo. Ask a combat c ommander in a modern
military force. Ask the fi eld or sales rep resentatives of compa nies selling the

ask the cogs.
It would be fitting to use more flight deck management throughout the Navy (and, in
fact, throughout the Department of Difense), because it is the management system most
suited to command and control in combat or at the edge of chaos. Every com
produc ts of new and swiftly developing technologies . And lastly,

mander-and, indeed, every civilian manager-has wrestled wi th the question
of where control of operations and taski ng should reside. The specific answer
varies with the technological level of the organization and the operation at hand.
The answer has usually been: as far up the command ladder as possible, without
saturating the command staff, and as far down the command ladder as absolutely
required. As the Navy's data collection, transmission and processing technologies
advance, the tendency is for the Navy to move decisio n making further up the
command ladder, b ecause it is believed that all relevant information can be ac
qui red and u tilized at the higher levels of command.
That is the wrong way to go. More and b etter information must be sent to the
lowest level that has a directly involved decision maker with th e scope and train
ing to understand and digest the information fully. The Navy must have and de
pend upo n experts operating in a loosely managed structure based on
information freely flowing in all directi ons (on a sort of "informati o n bus") . The
management system of the future-- a future which has already arrived-is the
flight deck system writ large, the most appropriate system for a technologically
advanced, responsive next Navy.
The flight deck has burst the bounds of its specific c o n text, and it is not
much of an exaggeration to say that the entire Navy faces a flight deck
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situation as it heads into the twenty-first century. In flight deck situations , a strict
and rigid chain of command based on organizational rank does not work. What
does work is a strict and flexible chain of c ommand based on skill and knowl
edge . What does work is having team members support the obj ective of the
organization by doing their j obs well during operatio ns in or at the edge of
chaos . What does work is having the organization exist primarily to support its
experts , enabling them to perform expertly within their areas of responsibillty.
In sum, here is what the flight deck teac hes the Navy:
• The function of the command levels is not to give ad hoc direction to
the team, but to define its tasks and to give the team the training, tools ,
information , and support needed to accomplish its tasks.
• For every sailor, officer and enlisted, the Navy must:
Define a reasonable scope of responsibility and authority
Provide training to do assigned tasks exceeclingly well
Provide accurate information needed to do the tasks
Recognize the experts' authority and importance and reward their
performance
Here endeth the lesson , but not the j ob---namely, bec oming the next Navy. Now
is the time to start. To that end, let us take a closer look at force structure and
fleet organization .
.

.

•

•

•

•

Force Structure
There are really three force structures to be examined: one for today, the sec
ond for tomorrow (the next Navy) , the third for the day after tomorrow (the
Navy-after-next) . Since the world is changing far faster than it did at the delib
erate pace of the recent past, all three structures must be considered simultane
ously. The Navy does not have the luxury for sequential change through gentle
stages at a measured pace. There is n o time for that, because everything is hap
pening all at once.
To day the United States boasts the best Industrial Age navy, one already in
transition to a trans-industrial (or post-industrial, or information , or knowl
edge-age) navy. In the future, as in the present, the Navy must be able to thwart
or defeat enemies and weapons of both the I ndustrial Age and its successor.
Some countries will be conve rting fro m agricultural to industrial economies, as
others move from industrial to trans-industrial economies. All countries will
•

In a certain sense, the organization subordinates itself to it< expe rts d u ring ed ge - o f-chaos o perations.
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change at different rates, and in some countries (such as China and India today) ,
various parts of society may leapfrog over whole stages of development. Gradual,
sequential c hange is out of the question for them, j ust as it is for the United
States.
The extre mely complex political-military environment will require some
naval forces similar to those of the present, augmented by the s hips and air
c raft programmed for procure ment over the next few years. T hat will be the
composition of the next Navy, to mo rrow's Navy. The nation needs i t, but in
and of itself the next Navy will be inadequate for the day after tomorrow.
B uying large quantities of today's military tools to fight developing asym
metric threats is simply not feasible ; America's defense budget cannot afford
it. Moreover, how many additional aircraft carriers, nuclear submarines ,
stealth bombers and fighters, S uper Hornets , main battle tanks, and Aegis
cruisers will we need to counter people s muggling asymmetric weapons for
use against the United S tates on its own territory? To counter terrorists and
their methods? To c ounter advanced biological weapons in the hands of
non-state enemies skilled in smuggling and terrorist techniques? Answer:
more than the nation can afford.
The Navy's experience in fighting drug smuggling is instructive. One ob
vious lesson is that it is very expensive to use sophisticated and powerful
Cold War-era combat systems against small and dispersed s mu ggling vehi
cles . Using battle groups (with operating costs of abou t half a million dollars
per day-not counting the costs of capitalizatio n , depreciation, and military
personnel) to counter light planes and small boats is a bit rich. And the de
gree of success does not come close to j u stifying the cost. Cheaper and sim
pler systems in larger quantities often prove to be more effective as well as
more economical.
As the threats and challenges change, and as capabilities for greater precisio n
evolve, some economical and very unconventional naval forces can be devel
oped-forces with higher orders of flexibility, agility, and global presence ability.
They will be equipped with additional, and quite different, tools to fight the
threats of the day after tomorrow. Such forces will be the nucleus of the Navy
after-next. That Navy cannot yet be exactly defined, but the stage for it can be
set now.
I t must be assumed that the Navy-after-next will b e c o mposed of s hips ,
aircraft. and submarines (though perhaps not exclusively-who knows?) .
However, some speculation is useful. and a few simple observations are ap
propriate.
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Ships
Powerful Navy ships tend to be large and expensive (see sideb ar) , but they can
b ecome cheaper and simpler as the i nfo r mation age p rogresses. In the fu
tu re-more so than to day-the second stage of the weapo n system will fre
quently be incorporated within the round. It will be less important to have
heavy hulls that carry heavy, second-stage machines. With speed, range, and ma
neuverability i ncreasingly engi neered a nd built into the ro u nd, the re will b e di
minished need for the same parameters in the combatant hull itself. S till , the
to tal weapon syste m will b e quicker, even though the launching platfo r m may
not be as fast and maneuverable as earlier pla tforms.
Advanced information tec hnology and be tter info rmation will enable mu ch
more accurate targeting and weapon guidance. Naval forces will not need as
many pieces of ordnance to provide the requisite explosive p ower for target de
structi o n . As well, magazine capacity for equivalent destructive p ower will de
crease, and ammu nition replenishme n t will drop in frequency. There will be a
less critical requirement fo r reple nishment s hips to haul ammunition to the bat
tle are a , b e cause the co mbatant ships will be carrying what they need for the
figh t .

Indeed,

transfer

of munitions

at

sea

is

an

inefficiency

that

the

Navy-thanks to technology-will be able to reduce significantly or even avoid
altoge ther.
Since the cost of. weapo n systems will be concentrated in the rou n ds, each
hull will not o nly b e relatively c heaper but also more lightly manned, requiring
fewer people to maintai n , operate, and pro tect a ship and its weapon systems. As
components o f a larger force dispersed over a wide are a , su ch ships can be knit
·
toge ther into a tigh t, resilient netwo rk for offense and defense. The ships will
go in to harm's way-there is no avoiding that-but the naval force 's damage
con trol " c o mpartments" will be separated by miles of seawa te r while re maining
mutually suppo rtive. Of course , deploying such a force avoids the risk of p re
senting a few expensive, massive targe ts to WMD.

None of the

foregoing is "pie in the sky." The "vision" can be e n gineered and

built with today's technology (see sidebar) .
As to the matte r of size, tonnage is c heap in comparison with any o th e r pa
ram e te r. I n fact, it can cost mo re to build a small ship than a large one, even if the
combat systems of each a re identical .
•

The critical measure of expense is life cycle cost

C o m p uter-based communications already give the Navy the ability to c o m m u ni c a te as efficiently and

effectively between ships as within a sin

gle

ship. Concentrating weaponry into o ne large ship no longer

necessarily affords any gre ater ability to co ncentrate fires . Therefore there is no reason to accept the risk of
p u tting most of the eggs into a few baskets, so to speak.
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Why Navy Ships Are Big
There are many reasons why Navy ships are big, but afew merit special note. The considera
tions listed here apply to the whole gamut of warship types of the Industrial Age,from the
Royal Navy's old sailing ships of the line to the most modern aircrcift carriers a nd cru isers.
Almost all comb atant ships are the first stage of the various weapo n systems
found ab oard them. That is, the ships are the platforms which carry the heavy ma
chines that c onstitute the second stages of the weapon systems . The second
stages-those which deliver the warhead to the target area-are guns or airplanes
o r missiles. Because these second-stage machines are usually big and bulky, the
ship that carries them is itself necessarily big and b ulky. And , generally speaking,
bigger guns and bigger planes-hence b igger ships-have been needed to put
more range into the second stage .
The direction and guidance of the weapo n systems of the Industrial Age are
imprecise relative to mo re modern weapons. Thus many pieces of o rdnance (such
as shells , b omb s, missiles , mines, and tor pedoes) a re required to e nsure target de
structi on. M oreover, ships expend imprecise o rdnance rapidly when e ngaged in
comb at, and neither returning to port nor replenishing daily underway is d esirable
during hostilities . Thus, large magazines are required, and large magazines entail
large ships . As well, large replenishment ships are required to carry more ammuni
tio n to the batde area s .
Ships must go d e ep i n t o harm's way b ecause m o s t current weapo ns have lim
ited range. Thus , ships require excellent speed, superior maneuverab ility, and
elab o rate damage c ontrol measure s , including extensive compartmentation .

All

these add more size and weight to ships already large.
And cost: the propulsion power, maneuverab ility, and size are dearly paid for.
C onsequendy, Industrial Age warships are built with as mu ch combat capacity as
possible.
In addition to making optimal use of ship size, concentrating weaponry into
one large ship facilitates communications . For Industrial Age warships , intra-ship
b o atswain's pipes, bugles, sound-p owered phones , and FM headsets are more reli
able fo rms of communication than ship-to-ship signal flags , semaphore , flashing
light, CW Morse, and UHE If the same amount of firepower is distributed among
many different ships, it is difficult to control . Put another way, given Industrial Age
c ommunications constraints , it is easier to concentrate fi re from one I ndustrial
Age ship than from many.
Of course, such ships require many people to maintain , operate, and p rotect
them . Large ships, large crews . And large crews need more space for messing and
b erthing.
The tendency, then, is to make Industrial Age ships very large indeed and to
load them wi th expe nsive, c omplex weapon sys tems and many people. These ships
are formidable, deadly, big, and valuable.
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per u nit of combat 1fectiveness.

If building a larger hull with no attendant de crease

in combat effectiveness can reduce life cycle costs , the choice is obvio u s-b uild
the large r ship. One possibility is to equip cheap commercial hulls (usually nei
ther fast nor mane uverable) wi th modularized combat systems . I n addition to
economy, these co uld re alize the advan tage of disguise (denial of information
through deception) while movi ng inconspic u o usly i n the wo rld's merchant traf
fic patterns.

Aircraft
Like Navy ships, powerful Navy aircraft tend to be large, heavy, and expensive
(see sidebar) . They too can become smaller, lighter, and cheaper as the info rmation
age progresses. Some aircraft will not need hu man aircrews. Remo tely piloted,
they will also b e remotely reprogrammed as required while i n flight. Not all re
motely piloted aircraft will need to be recovered; consequently, their airframes will
not have to be as rugged as thos e that have to endure carrier landings. Precisio n

*

weapo ns will allow aircraft to destroy targets with fewer, smaller weapons. Smaller
and fewer weapo ns mean smaller-hence less vulnerable--airc raft.

Submarines
For the future, sub marines must retain their traditional and most effec tive
fu nctions . However, the challenge for the submarine fo rc e will be to maintain
stealth characteristics while simultaneously improving command and control
connectivity. t Sea denial capabili ties , long the "bread and bu tter" of the Silent
Service, will be enhanced by the incorporation of n ew techn ologies . Revolu
tionary life-cycle cost advantages will also be realized when crew sizes de crease
and when every facet of design, constru c tion , operation , and maintenance re
flects that a nuclear submarine will be used fo r no longer than the life time of its
first-and only-nu clear reactor core .

§§§

*

Precision i s really only half of the equation: p recision a n d speed a r e the winning combination in a weapon

syste m . A phrase for the next century is "QUick and Exac t . "
Bistatic targeting for submarine-la unched precision weap ons m a y avoid s o m e o f t h e knotty a n d vexing

t

problems of subsurface-to-surface communications .

30

Sailing New Seas
Why Navy Aircraft Are Big
Piloted aircraft must carry at least one human, as well a s the fuel re quired to
carry the human and weapons to the desired ranges. The human is needed to op
erate and guide the weapon systems during the seco nd stage of we apon deliv
ery-namely, th e delivery by aircraft . Bec ause most of today's weapons are rather
"dumb " (with some weapons dumber than o thers) , the human provides a means
to reprogram them during delivery from the ship to the target.
The aircraft takes a tac ti c ally significant amount of time to move the weapon
to the targe t . D uring that time, tactical c o nditi ons may change, ne c essi tating
rapid human intervention in weap o n delive ry. Thus the human in the decision
loo p : the aircrew selects fro m a set o f targe ts and assigns weap ons, while continu
o usly evaluati ng the tacti cal environme nt-based on information obtained
through onboard sensors and via radio nets that relay information from other
datab ases (a cruiser's or a carrie r's , for example)-and making nece ssary adj ust
ments. By bringi ng human observation and analysis (and i nstinct) in communi
cation with the weap ons , the pilot adds flexibility and agility to the sec ond stage
of weapon delive ry.
Navy aircraft are large also bec ause they must carry many weapons . To con
serve warfighting time by making fewer transits , many weapons are carried per
sortie. Mo reover, targets and combat conditions may change in transit , so some
times it is necessary to carry different weapons on the same sortie.
Obviously, a human is needed to re turn the aircraft (which is a rec overable sec
o nd stage of the weapo n system) to the ship (the first stage of the weapon system) ,
The physical laws of impulse and momentum dictate the use of large, extremely
strong aircraft . There is no getting around the fac t that combat airc raft must be
able to endure repeated launches and recoveries and survive combat damage.

Ships , aircraft, and submarines are quite effective at projecting American
power, but nothing proj ects American power quite as convinci ngly as an infan
tryman-well-trained, well-armed, determined, probably tired and impa
tient-lo oking someone in the eye and telling him what to do. Nothing! The
Navy, of course, does no t have c ombat tro ops as the Army and Marines do.
However, it is part of the same j oint military team that is developing into a muc h
more tightly kni t force . A maj o r Navy mission is to bring that infantryman's
power to bear, wherever it is needed, and to provide that trooper with absolu tely
reliable and effective support. As the cruising force of the Navy-after-next
evolves , the Navy can embark platoons of c o mbat troops on board each of i ts
many, more lightly manned ship s , The Navy-after- next will include ground
fo rc es in i ts wide range of distributed firepower, assembling them into larger
concentrations as o ccasions demand.

31

The Newport Papers

Fl eet O rganization
The Navy h a s a n effective fleet, go o d en ough to d o most o f today's j obs very
well indeed. I t was built and organi zed o n a model that was painfully developed
and has proven to be effective , by heroes who deserve the greatest respect. The
Navy is rather comfortable with the model . It is an organization with which to
day's admirals grew up, whic h they understand we ll, and to whi

� they are loyal .

However, it is not the right model fo r the future, or fo r the jobs that may be as
sign e d to the Navy the day after tomo rrow. The Navy cannot continue to be or
ganized on the basis of its warfare specialties .
If an automobile company were organized th e way the Navy is , it would have
a D epartment of Drill P resses, a D epartment of S tampi ng Machines, a Depa rt
ment of Pai n t Stati o n s , a Department of Foundrie s , and so o n , with a vice p resi
dent in charge of each one. D epartments would be responsible fo r all operati o n s ,
main tenance, a n d trai ning related t o their equipment, wherever in t h e world i t
happened to be. Every manage r a n d fore man in e a c h department would have a
lapel pin de noting rank (by color: gold for managers, silver fo r foremen) and de 
partment (by shap e : drill p ress, stamping machine, paint station , etc .) . The com
pany would have Drill Press Associations , Stamping Associati o n s , Paint Shop
As sociations , and Foundry Ass ociatio n s . Each tool association would have ran k
a n d representation in t h e corporate o ffi c e s ro ughly comparable t o t h e perceive d
imp o rtan ce of the tool and to the power of the tool 's association.
I n re ali ty, healthy an d succes sful manufacturing o rganizations-ac tually, mos t
commercial o rganizations of any type-instead o rganize themselve s by p roduct
(or service) and functi o n . Usually they use a matrix o rgani zation of functions
and p roducts/services within each business u nit. Corporate s taffs execute tasks
(e . g. , marketing, legal) that are common or corporate only. Promotion to and
representation wi thin corporate ranks is dep endent upon results : that i s , upon
how well the fun ctions and p ro ducts/services are managed and h ow the bottom
line is affected.
Of course, auto mobiles and industrial equipment are not the Navy's p roducts .
Nor are ships, s ubmarines, or airc raft. Rather, the Navy 's products are the wa rfa re ca

pabilities it develops and r ift nes in order to win battles and execu te miss ions at sea and
from the sea. The Navy's business units are Fle ets, Battle Forces (defined below) ,
and Tas k Forc e s . Its bottom line is define d not in dollar s , but in what it costs to
execute warfare missions and tasks-c osts measured in terms of the warfare cur
rencies of time, casualti e s , capital equipment, and su pplie s . The Navy's tools are
ship s , planes , and submarines rath er than foundries and drill p resses.
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Yet despite differe nces in detail , the Navy's cu rrent organization is analogous
to the fictional business model de scribed above. That organization must change.
The Navy cannot afford its current structure: p ast, present, and future cuts reduce
that structure 's viability. Undeniable fiscal realities demand the planning and de
sign of a different model.
Organizational structure is one oj
the obvious places in which to realize
savings oj time, money, and billets.

The Navy is p resently too hierar
chical and too fragmented to be

D OD must reduce the overhead oj numerous

duplica tive staffs in both its administra tive
and opera tional chains oj command.
-Senator Sam Nunn

quick. It has too many staffs and
too many distributed functions to

There is a lo t oj waste a nd duplica tion to be

be efficient. The Navy will be

cu t .
-Senator C h arles Robb

quicker and more efficient if it is
organized less by its tools and

I

more by its products a nd services,
fu nctio n s , and business units. Its increased efficiency will reduc e bottom-line
costs.
What "end state" should the Navy seek? Given an e nvironment of pervasive,
rapid, a n d (probably) accelerating change , it is not possible-at best, it is impru
dent-to define an e nd state for the N avy based on things-e . g. , ships , ai rc raft,
and weapons. The end state ought i nstead to be based o n qualities-namely, un
surpassed (and u nsurpassable) a gility, flexibility, and quickness.

A

Notional Organizational Structure for the Next Navy

In light oj the Joregoing considerations, this Newport Paper sets Jorth a notional s truc
ture Jor the nex t Navy, a structure that improves the effe ctiveness of the Navy

while realizing efficiencies that will be nec essary in the fu ture. The prop osed or
ganizatio n, composed of an operational structu re and a support stru c ture (see
Chart

1) , is intended to

meet efficie ntly the needs of the next Navy while it pre

pares to be come the Navy-after-next.
Specifically, the primary obj ec tive of this reo rganization is at least to main
·
tai n quality in the "product line " (warfa re capabilities) at current operational
levels , while consolida ti ng functions at the supp ort levels . The re organizatio n is
based on the following para meters:
•

At least to maintain, not only to maintain. Improvement is always a goal .
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Chart 1

FUNCTIONS
COMNAVUSA FUNCTIONAL COMMANDS
Maintenance
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t Power
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Other Than
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2"' FLT
SOLANT

6" FLT
CINCPACFLTNIlT
3ID FLT
5'" FLT
7TH FLT

Note: The products (warfare capabilities) are incorporated in the commands Buixlrdinate to CINCLANTFLT....
and CINCPACFLT...., each of which is a complete package of Navy warfare capabilities.

•

Compliance with the law (Title

10

of the u. s. Code) in accordance

with the intentions of Congress as specified i n the Goldwater-Nichols
Department of Defense Reorganization Act of
•

1 986

Distribution of functions and reduction of function duplication to realize savings in manp ower and mo ney

•

A flatte ned structure to achieve speed and agility

•

Decentralized decision making fo r maximu m flexibili ty and quickness

•

Increased regional presence to improve efficiency ashore and to increase
involve ment with civilia n communities

Many models can be made to work, and any model can b e made not to work
(or, by its critics , made to seem unworkable) . Most corp o rations that have tried
various sol u tions to their own problems have failed in implementation, regardless
of how accurate their diagnoses and p rescrip tions we re . They simply could not
stomach their own medicine. The real challe nge facing the Navy is not so mu ch
to determine what its p roblems are and how to solve them, bu t to do what nee ds
to be done.
The Navy is still in the diagnosis and p rescription stage . Yet to come is the
really tough part: taking its medicine. However diffic ult that task may be, i t must
be done, for to do nothing is to i nvite disaster, no matte r h ow muc h is said.
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Notional Operational Structure

The Chain of Command
"The National Command Authori ties ( N C A) , consi sting of the President and
the Secretary of Defense, or their authorized alternates, exercise authority over
the Armed Forces through the combatant commanders for those forces assigned
to the combatant commands and through the Secretaries of the Military De
partments and the Chiefs of the Services for those forces not assigned to the
4
combatant commands., , Our concern here is with the operational chain of
command which flows fro m the NCA to the combatant commanders, also
,
known as combatant commanders-in-chief (CINCs) . Each C INC holds war
fighting responsibility for a geographic area of the world and is direcdy responsi
ble to the NCA for mission execution and readiness. A component commander
from each of the armed forces serves each C I Ne.
In the next Navy, the naval component commanders for the C INCs are

( C I NCLANTFLTnex J and Com
( C INCPAC FLTnext) . Each has a broad geo

Commander-in-Chief, U. S. Adantic Fleet
mander-in-Chief, U. S. Pacific Fleet

graphic scope, but a narrow functional scope. The geographic scope of
C I NCPAC FLTnext ' with headquarters in Pearl Harbor, Hawaii , is roughly equiva

lent to that of the traditional CINCPACFLT. CINCLANTFLTnex, ' with headquar
ters currendy in Naples, Italy, has a geographic scope roughly equivalent to the
areas

of

responsibility

traditionally

assigned

to

C INCUSNAVEUR

and

CI NCLANTFLT, combined. In this construct, PAC OM and CENTC OM are

serviced by C I NCPACFLTnext ; EUCOM and SOUTHC OM are serviced by
C INCLANTFLT nex t .

These fleet commanders focus on joint warfare capabilities, the true products if the
Navy. The agile, responsive support structure of the next Navy-the notional
Commander, Naval Forces in the United States ( COMNAVUSA ) -is responsi

ble for supporting the fleet commanders across the full range of combat func
tions.

Operational Structwe: Primary Staff Functions of the Navy Component
Commander in Support of Serviced Combatant Commanders
In support of the C I NCs whom they service, C I NCLANTFLTnex, and
CI NCPAC FLTnex,' as currently direc ted by QCS :

5

•

Make recommendations for force employment

•

Accomplish all operational missions assigned by the combatant CINCs
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•

Sele c t and nominate specific N avy uni ts for assignmen t to othe r subor

•

Conduc t j oint training

•

I nfo r m c o mbatant c o mmanders of changes in logistic support that

dinate j oint fo rc es

will signifi c antly affect their planning and ability to exe cute their mis
SIOns
•

Develop program and budge t requests that c omply with the c o mbatant
c ommanders ' guidance o n warfare re quirements and priorities

•

I nform combatant co mmanders of program and budget decisions that
may affect planning of j oint operations

•

Provide naval fo rce data in support of j oint operations and exercise
plans

C I N CLANTFLTnext and CINCPACFLT nex t are also respo nsible for the fol-

lowing service-specific functions wi thin each combatant command:
•

Inte rnal administration and discipline

•

Training in Navy doctrine, tactic s , and techniques

•

Naval logistic fu nctions

•

Naval intelligence

Withi n their own commands the Navy compo nent commanders are responsible for :
•

The traini ng and readi ness o f battle fleets and task groups

•

Navy operational and battle planning

•

D efinition o f N avy tactical warfare requirements

Operational Structure: Direct Subordinates of the Navy Component
Commanders
Directly sub ordinate to the Navy component commanders are the Numbered
Fleet Commanders (NFC s) /Joint Forc e Commanders OFCs) . COMSOLANT,
SECOND, and SIXTH Fleets are subordinate to CINCLANTFLTnex t; THIRD,
FIFTH , and SEVENTH Fleets are subordinate to CINCPACFLTnext . Each

NFCI]FC

has direct liaison with the supportingJunctional commands under COMNAVUSA .
Immediately below the numbered fleet level are the next Navy's six bat tle
fo rces, wi th each battle force c ommander directly subordinate to a numbered fleet
c ommander. Each battle force is built around a permanently assigned core of
two aircraft ca rriers and two amphibious assault ships ; other ships , aircraft, sub
marines, gro und fo rces, and exp editionary units are assigned as appropriate. Like
an N FC/JFC, a battle force staff has direct liaison with thefunctional commands s ubordi
nate to COMNA VUSA .
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Each battle force is the primary nexus for the administration , training, and
co mmand and control of the combat units assigned to it. That is, the re are in the
next

Navy six principal j u n c tions

whe re

support

and

operations

co n

nect-namely, the six battle force s . In each battle force the shore support fo r
s hips, aircraft, and submarines converges with the operation of c o mbat units o n ,
above, o r under t h e s e a . In particular, a battle fo rce i s t h e point a t which all sin
gle- and multi-unit underway training is tie d toge ther. The responsibility for
training a given battle force and its units lies solely with the battle force co m
mander and key subordinates in command. That is, the battle fo rce co mmander,
staff, and sub o rdinate comman ding office rs-rather than seve ral dispersed
training commands afloat and as hore-co o rdinate, c onduct, an d evaluate sin
gle- and multi-unit training in accordance with flee t-wide gui dance and stan
dards established by the next Navy's Fle e t Training and Do ctrine C o mmand
(se e page

42) . The battle fo rce

is the point of crossove r betwe e n the adminis

trative and operational structure s .
O n a smaller scale, a

task force i s

a subse t o f units drawn

ad hoc from within

a

given battle force for assignment to an NFC/] F e . It is organize d and trained to
meet specific needs of a combatant CINe. At the direction of a CINC, special
ized assets may be assigned to augment a task force . For exampl e , a task force re
quiring a more robust surveillance capability could draw on SEAL teams, MPA ,
special mission s ub marines, UAV squadrons, etc.
Also directly under the Navy component commande rs are fo rces with highly
specialized missions. These force s , composed of units ofte n found in relatively

small numbers : can be assigned as elements of task forces or as c orps-level forces
with specific missions.

Lastly, C INCLANT FLT ne xt and C I NCPACFLT nex t each have a Fleet Tactics and
Planning Support Group. The Group trains task forces in joint warfare tactics
(training in unit tactics falls under the purview of battle forc e co mmanders) , and
it supports an NFC/]FC in campaign (ope rational level) planning.

Notional Support Structure
Commander, Naval Forces in the United States (C OMNAVUSA) p rovides
support in training, tactical development, perso nnel, maintenance , co mmunica
tions, intelligence, and logistics to the Navy component commanders ,
COMNAVUSA
•

For example:

is

MPA,

the

provider

of all

forces

to

worldwide.

CIN CLANTFLTn e xt

and

SeaBees, submarines, salvage units, replenis h m e n t ships, unique train i n g assets .
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CINCPACFLT next for operation by their subordinate commande rs . H e adquarters

for C OMNAVUSA is Norfolk, Virginia .

CO MNAVUSA i s a supporting struc tu re whose very design aims a t improvi ng

re sponse times and reducing expenditures by consolidating common func tions
and eliminating redundant suppo rt billets. Commanders i n the supporting
structure have responsibili ty for fewer fu nctions . However, their geographic
·
scope is (world)wide while their fu nctional scope is narrow.
C OMNAVUSA is an unequivocal , thoroughgoing shift away from the organ

izational struc tu re of today's Navy. The shift is driven by the need for the next
Navy to u tilize

the

organizati onal

schemes

of successful

modern busi

nesses-sc hemes proven to work in the trans-industrial age. The Navy's c urrent
organization is built aro und platform stovepipes (air, surface, and subsurface) ,
each one incorporating the primary functions of maintenance, training, logistics,
and personnel management. That method of organization has been effective, but
also intfficient.
The next Navy's orga nization realizes efficiency in a moder n matrix sche me,
in whi c h the columns are junctions (e. g. , maintenance, training, person nel , logis
tics) , and the rows are wa ifare capabilities (see Chart

1 ) . One advantage tha t imme

diately results is a sharpening of command focus. COMNAVUSA focuses on
effective accomplishment of functions necessary to enable and sustain naval war
fare ; CINCLANTFLTnext and CINCPACFLTnext focus on the operation and figh t

ing of naval forces at sea. As the Navy component co mman ders for the
combatant CINCs, they have control of all Navy operations, eithe r dire ctly or
th ro ugh their subordinate commanders . Subordinate NFCs are ro utinely as
signed as j oint force commanders or as the Navy componen t c ommanders of

j oint force commands .
Efficiency is also immediately achieved b y a n elimination o f redundan cy. To
day's Navy has six maj o r type commands, each one having its own maintenance
organization , co mpose d of experts and supporting perso nnel . Withou t cu tting the
numbers oj "va lue-added " maintenance experts, the next Navy obtains the following
benefits from th e consoli dation of re dundant functions :
•

Greater interaction between experts in the same functional field (effi

•

Reduc tion of the number of supporting personnel re quired to serve the

cient use of tal ent)
experts (efficient use of people)
Furthe rmore, the next Navy is more effici ent by virtue of its imp rove d,
streamli ned c oordination among fu nctions. The orga nizational structure of
New i nfo rma ti on technologies e nable this to be
technological advan c es is imperati ve .

•

done . Le ar ni ng the effe ctive and e fficient use of these
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today's Navy is seriously weak in its coordination of functions between plat
forms of different types: among its thick-walled stovepipes, functions are dupli
cated at great cost (in people and money) and with little or no inter-type
coordination. That arrangement does not appropriately use the information
technology of the current era, and it does not facilitate joint operation of the
u. s. Armed Forces. The organization of the next Navy corrects those deficien
cies. Since functions are not duplicated across platform types, many fewer staff
personnel are required to coordinate special platform needs across functions.
Coordination of functions for specific operational needs falls to the naval war
fighting staffs.
As in today's Navy, in the modern matrix the Navy component commanders,
CINCLANTFLTnext and CINCPACFLTnext ' represent the combatant CINCs to
the Navy (and vice versa) . Also in continuity with the current structure, the
numbered fleet commanders may act as joint force commanders or as naval
component commanders for jFCs. However, the NFCs currently have little im
pac t on the functional support they receive, except through the traditional fleet
CINCs (CINCLANTFLT and CINCPACFLT) , often via the platform type com
manders. In contrast, the next Navy's modern matrix provides flatter, better, and
more efficient support of the NFC/jFC and the other naval operators .

Support Structure: COMNAVUSA Staff
(Centralized Functions)
Briefly, the COMNAVUSA staff functions are: Navy component commander
for USACOM; battle technology innovation; comptroller; fleet warfare require
ments; measuring and monitoring fleet readiness; public affairs; and legal services. *
COMNAVUSA will be the Navy component commander Jor USACOM.
USACOM is a unified combatant command whose missions are to :
• Plan and execute operations within its area of responsibility
• Conduct j oint training of assigned cONUS-based forces and jTF staffS
• Provide trained and ready joint forces to supported CINCs as directed
by the National Command Authority

COMNA VUSA remains the single point of contact Jor USACOM on all matters
related to Navy component Junctions. While retaining overall responsibility, it trans

fers the following operational functions of the USACOM Navy component
*

A n o t e o n staff composition: t h e COMNAVUSA staff includes a Chief Operating Officer (civilian) , but not

a deputy c ommander. The Chief Operating Offic er ensures the continuity of policy and management

expertise that c an be gained only through long-term , deep , accountable involvement.
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Whither

USACOM?

Over time, USACOM will probably evolve into a j oint training and readiness
co nunand similar to that suggested in the Goldwater-Nichols Act of 1 986. This
concept was supported by General Colin Powell, C)CS ; envisioned and ordered by
Secretary of Defense Les Aspin in 1 9 9 3 ; and approved by President Bill Clinton on
September 29, 1993. Specifically, USACOM will probably develop into an organiza
tion that:
•

Forms, trains , and provides j oint task forces (or groups or elements) to the
combatant CINCs or Joint Force C ommanders, in response to the mission
requirements of the other CINCs and the Secretary of Defense .

•

Provides military support and assistance during natural disas ters or civil dis

•

Plans for the land defense of CONUS

•

Turns over responsibili ty for all nations, territo ries, and non-national seas in

•

Divests itself of NATO responsibilities as SACLANT

turbances in CONUS

the current U SACOM area of responsibility to o ther combatant CINCs
When the o cean areas currently assigned to U SACOM pass to o ther combatant
CINCs, COMNAVUSA will directly execute

all Navy component functions for

USACOM .

commander to C INCLANTFLTnex1 and/or C IN CPACFLTnexl:
•

Make recommendations for force e mployment

•

Accomplish assigned operational missions

•

Select and nominate specific Navy u nits for assignment to other subor
dinate j oint forces

•
•

Conduct j oint training
Inform USACOM of changes in logistic support that have significant ef
fects on planning

•

Provide force data i n support of j oint operation and exercise plans

•

Conduct training in Navy doctrine, tac tics, and techniques

COMNAVUSA directly executes the following service-specific fu nctions

within USACOM:
•

Develop program and budget requests that comply with USACOM
guidance on warfare requirements and priorities

•

Inform USACOM of program and budget decisions that may affect
planning of j oint operations

•

Provide internal administration and discipline

•

Execu te Navy logistic functions within the command

•

Supervise Navy intelligence matters and activities

I n the

battle technology innovation area, the staffis u nder the direction of a senior

civilian executive, and administers the Navy Science Assistance Program
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(NSAP ) .

COM NAVUSA staff is linked to the tec hnical ne twork of warfare c e n

ters; program e xecu tives; OPTEVFO R ; priva te industry; Navy a nd other service
laboratories; university laboratories; national laboratories; and fo reign navies .
The staff identifies fle e t needs that may b e me t by the utilization of new tech
nologies and-within the c ons traints of security re quire ments-co mmunicates
these nee ds to ele ments of the ne two rk. To b e effective in this endeavor,
C O MNAVUSA staff must maintain awaren ess of promising n ew technological

applic ations and concepts . (Given the explosive rate of technologic al develop
ment, that is a challenge . ) Las tly, C O MNAVUSA staff conducts and analyzes ex
pe riments for ass essment of technical initiatives, and facilitates "fast track"
integrati on of innovative technologies with new or modifi ed doctrine , tactics ,
and techniqu e s .
The C O MNAVUSA comptroller p rovides resou rces direc tly to op e rating fo rc es
·
and to Naval Region Co mmande rs for the infrastructure within the i r responsi
bility. The c omptroller also :
•
•

Centralizes budgeting, and monitors and manages bu dge t execution
Works with operating forc es to maximize re adiness at the lowest possi
ble financial costs

•

Distributes acc o untability to de cision levels

•

Compiles and submits resource re quireme nts to Financial Management
B udget (FMB)

COMNAVUSA staff has overall respo nsib ility for the de finition an d sub mis

sion offleet warfare req uiremen ts. It consolidates warfighting require ments fro m
CIN CLANTFLTnex, and C I NCPAC FLTnex, ' a n d combat support re quire me nts

from the functional commande rs. C O MNAVUSA then sub mits all fleet warfare
requirements to the Navy budge t and program authorities. As a Navy c ompo
nent commander, COM NAVUSA advises USAC OM of Navy bu dge t and pro
gram decisions affecting j oint warfare re quirements . Similarly, COMNAVUSA
advises CIN CLANT FLTn ex, and C I N C PAC FLTnex, of those de cisio ns affecting
their own fu nctions as Navy component co mmanders.
C O MNAVUSA is the central authority fo r measuring and m o nitoringfleet readi

ness, setting standards and obj e ctives in concert with se rviced co mmands and

organizations . The staff establishes measures; collects data into a single, wi dely
accessible datab ase ; and provides exp ert fee dback to managers of serviced
commands and organizatio ns . Attac hed to the staff is a neu tral measure
men t and analysis group similar to NWAD Corona, incorporating skills and
pers o nnel fo und in organiza tio ns of inspectors gen e ral. COMNAVUSA uses

•

These are no tional entities whose functions are described below.
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non -financial measures of combat readiness , combat efficiency, organizatio nal
efficiency, and organizational effectiveness .

Lastly, COMNAVUSA is in charge of fleet public affairs and legal services.

Support Structure: Direct Subordinates of COMNAVUSA
(Decentralized Functions)
F u nctional commanders in the next Navy's COMNAVUSA are analogous to
the level of executive management often referred to as type co mmanders in to
day's Navy. Six executives, assigned as Echelon I I I commanders, execute the
functions required to support forces afloat. Their commands are Fleet Training
and Doctrine Command; Fleet Maintenance Command; Fleet Combat S upport
Co mmand; Fleet S ubmarine Command; Fleet Expeditionary Command; and
Fleet Operations S upport Command. They are described in more detail below.

*

Fleet Training and Doctrine Command (three stars , unres tricted line) :
•

Fleet Manpower Distribu tion Center

•

Fleet Tac tics and Doctrine Center (incorporates SWDG, SUBDEVRONs, VXs, NSAWC, and NAVDOC)

•

Fleet Training Center (includes some fleet schools)

•

Naval War College

•

Fleet Chaplains Center

Fleet Tactics and Doctrine Center develops, formulates, and evaluates doc
trine and tactics for naval platforms , u nits , battle forces , and task forces (see Ap
pendix

B) .

It maintains close working relationships with j oint and unique

service commands also focused on tactics and doctrine.
Fleet Training Center provides standards and measures for

all fleet

unit train

ing, as well as measurement guidance and analysis to battle force commanders in
s upport of unit and force traini ng. The standards and measures focus on the tasks
essential to the execution of Navy missions, and emphasize time as a measure of
readiness (see page

62).

Fleet Maintenance Command (ships a n d aircraft; three stars , u n restricted line) :
•

*

Director, Maintenance Resources (senio r civilian executive)

•

I ndustrial Facilities Manager (two stars , restricted line)

•

Director, Fleet Tec hnical Support Center (one star, restricted line)

•

Director, Maintenance and Modernization (one star, restricted line)

N .B. Flanening is not necessarily related to rank--che Navy

can

have a flat o rganization w it h

twice

as

many three-star admirals. Rather. flattening is related essentially to how many (or how few) wickets a decision
must go through before action

is

taken. Puc another way. the question to ask in assessing the flatness of an

organization is " H o w convoluted is the path that a customer must take to get the needed product or servic e ? "
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•

Maintenance Pro c esses Manager (s enior civili an exe c u tive)

Director, Maintenance Resources includes Bu dgets and Schedules ; Hu man
Resources and Maintenance Training; Business Measures and Analysis ; Con
tracts ; and Comptroller Linkage.
Industrial Facilities Manager in cludes Fleet Maintenance Facilities ; Indus
trial Policy; Manufacturing; Repai r ; Technol o gy ; and Intermediate Mainte
nan c e .
Director, F l e e t Te chnical Support Center includes Ship Systems ; Combat
Systems ; Aviation Systems ; C41 Systems ; FTSC Detachments ; Technical Library;
and Platform Configuration Rec o rds .
Direc to r, Maintenance and Mo derni za tion incl u des Regional Maintenance
C enters ; Surface and CV /CVN; Submarines ; Aircraft ; Craft and Boats; Compo
nents ; and Maintenance Requirements.
Maintenance Processes Manager includes Quality Assuran c e ; Work Docu
ments ; Job Control; and 3M.

Fleet Combat Support Command (three

stars , unrestricted line ; deputy is the di-

rector of Logistics Support) :
•

Logistics S upport (two stars , Supply Co rps)

•

Strategic Lift (one-star, unrestricted line)

•

Combat Engineering S upport (two stars, Civil Engineer C orps)

•

Health Affairs (one star, Medical, Dental , or Medical Service Corps)

Logistics Support includes FISC Operations, Plans , and Policy (th ere are six
FISCs-Yokosuka, Pearl Harbor, Puget S ound, San Diego, Norfolk, Jackson
ville ) ; Acquisition; Fleet Inventory Management and Fuels Service; and Ord
nance Management Service.
Strategic Lift includes Military S ealift Transportation Service

(MSTS) ; C o m

bat Logistics Force; and Cargo Handling Support Group.
Combat Engine ering Support includes Navy M obile C o nstruction Battal
ions and Unde rwater Construction Teams.
Health Affairs includes Fleet Hospitals; Medical and Dental ; Sanitation ; and
Mortuary Affairs .

Fleet Submarine Command

(thre e stars , unrestricted line) :

•

Maritime Patrol C ommand (two stars, unrestricted line)

•

Underwater Surveillance Center (one star, unrestricted line)

•

Fleet Strategic Submarine Forc e (one star, unrestricted line; worldwide

•

Fleet Submarine Force (two stars , unrestricted line ; worldwide opera

operations)
tions)

Fleet Expeditionary Command

(two stars , u nrestricted line) :
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•

Mine Warfare Command (one star, unrestricted line)

•

Navy Special Warfare Command (one s tar, restricted line)

•

Fleet Special Operations and Construction Co mmand (one star, line o r
staff; C B s , EOD, AC Us, MD SU, e tc . )

Fleet Operations Supp ort Command (two s tars, unrestricted o r restricted line ;
Commander double-hatted as the Fle et Infor mation Officer) :
•

Fleet N e twork Services

•

Flee t Informatio n S e rvices

•

Fleet Infor mation Warfare Centers

Fleet Network Services is resp onsible fo r ship- to-ship and ship-to-sh o re
connectivity, and fo r LAN and WAN operations .
Fleet Info rmation S e rvices includes Intelligence S e rvice ; Cryptography
Servic e ; and Database M aintenanc e.
I n addition to the six fu nctional commanders there are eight Naval Region
Commanders (two stars, unrestricted line) subordinate to COMNAVUSA. They
maintain close ties to civilian co mmunities and Federal Executive Boards. To th e
extent feasible, the Naval Region Comman ders consolida te all common func
tions of tenant commands in a give n area: Su ch functions include administra
tion; public safe ty; fu el; fo od services; child care ; personnel support; brig; rolling
stock; public affairs; legal services; medical/dental; environmental health and
safe ty; buildi ng maintenance ; p ublic works ; utilities; housing; c onstruction; and
re creation. The Naval Regi ons are:
•

Naval Region Washington , D. c.

•

Naval Region Northeast
•

Fede ral Regions 1 and 2 (Maine, New Hampshire, Vermont, Massa

•

Europe and Mrica

chusetts, Rhode Island, Connecticut, N ew York, N ew Jersey)
•

Naval Region M id-Atlantic
•

Federal Regions

3 and 5

(Delaware, Pennsylvania, Maryland, Virginia,

West Virginia, Ohio, Indiana, Michigan , Illinois , Wisconsin, Minne
sota)
•

•

*

Canada

Naval Region S outheast

One way for Naval Region Commanders t o conso l i date functions is to make the commanding officers of

major commands within the regions perform additional duties as

functional

managers ,

Functional

management thus goes to subordinate c ommanders , not to the staff of the Naval Region C ommander. This
method of consolidatio n has the meri t of broadening a commander's geo graphic perspe c tive with a fu ncti onal
pe�pective that e nc ompasses an entire regio n and crosses warfare community lines. The Naval Region
C omma nder arbitrates dispu tes among fu nc tional managers in a region, but is not rou tinely i nvolved in
functional management.
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•

Federal Region 4 (North Carolina, South Carolina, Georgia, Florida,

•

South America, Puerto Rico, Caribbean

Alabama, Mississippi , Tennessee, Kentucky)
•

Naval Region Midwest
•

Federal Regions 6 and 7 (Louisiana, Texas , New Mexico, O klahoma,
Arkansas, Missouri, Kansas , Nebraska, Iowa)

•

•

•

Central America

Naval Region So uthwest
•

Federal Region 9 (California , Arizona, Nevada; not Hawaii)

•

South Asia

Naval Regi o n Northwest
•

Federal Regions 8 and 1 0 (Washington , Alaska, Orego n , Idaho, U tah ,

•

Northeast Asia

Colorado, Wyoming, M o ntana, North Dakota, S o u th Dakota)
•

Naval Regi o n Pacific
•

H awaii

•

Guam, Central Pacific, Southwest Pacific, S o u theast Asia

Warfare Commu n ity Rep resentation and Leadersh ip
in the Next N avy
Airplanes, missiles, submarines, ships , and boats are too ls with which the
Navy's p roducts-waifim capabilities-are built. The next Navy is organized on the
basis ofJunctions and products, not tools. Functional c o mmanders command the
combat support structure, and j o i n t force commanders (who are often num
bered fleet commanders) apply the naval warfare capabilities required by the
co mbatant C INCs .
Senior submarine, surface, air, amphibious, and mine warfare spe cialists are
designated the "champions " of their respective warfare communiti es . H owever,
three-star communi ty represe ntation and leadership is discontinued, j ust as
three-s tar program sponsors were downgraded on the staff of the Chief of Naval
O perations in 1 993 . The Navy no longe r needs communi ty rep resentation and
leadership a t the headquarters level-j ust as industrial firms no lo nger nee d drill
p ress, foundry, and weldin g machine community representation and leadership
at the corporate level.
Nevertheless, in the next Navy, significant warfare c o mmunity representation
continues at the headquarters level in the office of the D eputy Chief of Naval Op
erations for Resources, Warfare Requirements, and Assessments (N8, OPNAV) . By
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virtue of its focus on program sponsorship, N8 is charged with planning fo r fu
ture technologies and programs within the " toolkits" of the warfare commu ni
ties.
The numbered fleets have air, surface, submarine, and amphibious warfare
specialties represented by staff warfare specialists. These staff experts submit in
puts to

CINCLANTFLT next

and

CINCPACFLTnext

(via the

NFCs)

on near-term

warfare require ments . Staff warfare specialists also link with the fun ctional struc
ture and i nfluence it through their expertise.
The six battle force commanders have staff elements and subordinate flag of
ficers with warfare specialty foci. Each submits inpu ts on requirements defini
tio n and program administration directly to an

NFC.

Most of the flee t schools will maintain a community focus.

§§§
The bo ttom lin e : warfare community represen tatio n and leadership are re
duced in the next Navy. Now is the time to do this. It is a notion whose time has
com e-aga i n . D ecades ago, Navy leadership had all flag officers remove their
badges of community identification at the time of promotion to flag rank. The
wisdom behind that action must once again prevail as the Navy steps forward
into the e ra of genuine j o int warfare effectiveness .
Some excellent Sailors may be u nable to make this adj ustment. Over the years
they have developed an intense loyalty to the tools of their trade, often at the ex
pense of higher loyalty to the Navy. It is time to help them find remunerative
employment in follow-on careers . They should be rewarded handsomely for
their years of good and faithful service. (The reader should u nderstand that not
an ounce of sarcasm is intended here.) They have followed their leaders , have
served the Navy and the nation well, and have made many sacrifices. The Navy
and the nation owe them a tremendous debt of gratitude.
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Part Three

. . . and how to do it.

Getting from. Here to Tll1L ere�
The Most DifficlIJlllt Part
A n d, oj course, the toughest part oj the equation is how we get from here to there.
-Senator Charles Robb

One may know how to conquer without being able to do it.
-Sun Tzu

C

HANGING AN ORGANIZAT I ON as large and complex as the Navy is a
challenging undertaking. No one person and no one staff can know or re

solve all the issues and details. What is more, not even all the Sailors and all the
staffs can know all of the issues and details b efore change begins. Nonetheless, a
destination, a goal, or a port to steer for is required; this Newport Paper seeks to
define that goal. Once the goal is defined, actio n can-must-begi n .
The Navy must be willing t o sail in these new seas , to leave the comforts o f
old, familiar shores a n d cruise into the unknown. It must make all p reparations
for getting underway. Then it must weigh anchor and depart the anchorage, be
ing careful to keep the ancho r at short stay in case so mething goes wrong. The
following are the steps the Navy should start taking now.
•

Single up all type commanders , focusing them on unit-type training,
tactics, and safety. The six type commanders become thre e :
•

COMNAVSURFOR-Commander, Naval Surface Force, Norfolk,
Virginia
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COMNAVAIRFOR-Commander, Naval Air Force, San Diego,
California
COMSUBFOR-Commander, Submarine Force, Norfolk, Virginia.
During the period of transition, each type commander takes the
former geographic counterpart as deputy (e.g. , COMNAVSUR FPAC becomes
Deputy, COMNAVSURFOR) .
•

•

Shift to a battle force structure
Move all fleet maintenance to a single Fleet Maintenance Command
• Move all fleet supply, inventory management, and o rdnance manage
ment to a single Fleet Combat Support Command
• Establish the naval regions as described herein
When the Navy is well clear of the anchorage and in the channel, it must get
some way on, leave the harbor, and steer for sea. At that point it should:
•
Institute CINCPACFLTnexl' CINCLANTFLTnexl' and COMNAVUSA as
described herein
• Eliminate type commands and shift to functional commands as de
scribed herein
•
Focus the fleet inspectors general on non-financial standards, measures,
analysis, and management assistance in support of training and readiness
•
•

§§§

Each of the commands and staffs involved in any of the changes recom
mended is laden with highly educated and thoroughly experienced talent. This
talent must be channeled as necessary to lead the entire Navy and the broader
joint structure into the twenty-first century. Change can be implemented only
through leadership that is effective, even (at times) inspiring.
The voyage the Navy faces now is different from any other that it has taken.
To ensure the Navy successfully navigates and dominates the new seas it sails,
Navy leadership needs some new tools and weapons, and the understanding to
use them competently. Specifically, these are :
•
•
•

Organizational quickness
A focus on time as a measure of readiness, effectiveness, and efficiency
A refined, streamlined requirements process
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Get Q u ick
A ll Organizations Should Give Primary Emphasis To Developing Quickness.

*

The reader is probably familiar with an obj ect called "the learning curve," the
S-shaped curve that shows how the rate at which one learns something varies
with time. The learning rate starts slowly; gradually and then more rapidly in
creases; and finally tapers off to something very close to the initial learning rate .
Plotting "Amount Learned" on the vertical , and " T i m e Sp ent Learning" on t h e
horizontal , a typical curve looks like this (see Figure

Figure

1:

1).

The Learning Curve

1

Time Spent Learning

�

The learning curve describes the rate at which people learn calculus, for ex
ample. Initially baflli n g, or at least tedious, it soon starts to become clear. Then
they rapidly absorb differentiation, integration , partial differentials , and multiple

*

In the context of this paper,

'quick"ess' implies the ability of an organization o r p e rson to ada p t itself rapidly

and agilely to a changing environment. This section uses the S-curve to demonstrate why the Navy must
become a qu icker organizatio n by de creasing its decision cycle times. Read patiently and carefully, and the
point-GET QUICK-will be clear.
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integrals. However, learning may slow down a bit when they hit ve c to r calc ulus ,
multivariable a nalysi s, Bessel functions, a n d Gu dermanian fu nctions in hyp e r
bolic trigonome try.
Similar S-curves are used to de scribe phase transitions in the natural scie nces
and in the development of business o rganizations (from entrepreneurial be gin
ni ngs, through rapid expansion, to maturity) : The S-curve applies also to the de
velopment of societies. It shows how societies evolve during what is c alled a
"paradigm shift " (in one parlance) or a "phase shift " (in another) . The Renaissance
was such a shift , as was the Industrial Revolution. For exa mple, an S-cu rve can be
used to describe the rates at whi ch industrial society developed during the I ndus
trial Revolutio n: initially cha nging very sl owly, then very rapidly, and then very
slowly agai n . Moder n industrialized societies are now at the far right side (the flat
ter portion) of the curve. That portion of the curve looks like this (see Figure

2) .

Figure 2
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*

He

I n 1 98 1 , Jonas Salk used an S-c u rve to describe the evolution, gro wth, and de velopment of Jiving systems .
claimed that the S-curve applied not only to biological systems, but also to social systems . Although Salk's

claim was accepted by some, it was criticized by others . Nevertheless, over the next decade the S-curve
c o nc ept was successfully applied by some authors and co nsultants to manageme nt theory and technological
i nnovatio n. I n the development of complexity the ory, biotechnologists , economists, chemists, and physicists
have used S-curves to describe phase transitio ns of co evolving social and technological structures.

52

Sailing New Seas
An S-curve also describes how human socie ty is developing during the c ur
rent trans-industrial revolution . In this case, the world is now o n the left side of
the curve and-as this write r and many others believe-j ust entering the steep
slope portion . That means that the po rtion of the c urve relevant to this period
looks something like this (see Figure 3) .

Figure

3
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Of course, there is no way of knowing, without the wisdom of hindsight,
what the exact shape of the curve really is or where the trans-in dustrial world is
·
located on it. However, if the above assessmen t of the trans-indus trial period is
close to correct, then o rganizations today face a very different problem on the
steep portion of the trans-industrial curve than they did in the flattened, right
hand portion of the industrialization c u rve.
To make this point clearer, consider portions of the c u rve more closely and
with a more analytical eye , starting with the mature end of the industrialization
curve.
•

The wri ter s uspects that the s teep p ortion of t he trans-industri al S-curve, because of the very rapid rate o f

change in this era, will b e m u c h steeper than the analogous portion o f t h e i ndustrializatio n S-c urve. B u t that
opinion need not be argued fo r this discuss i o n.
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Referring to Figure 4, suppo se the Navy is at time x and wa nts to define how

it mus t develop to execute i ts missions-and thus survive and prosper-fifteen

years fro m now, at time x + 1 5 . (This assumes it takes about fifteen years to re ori

ent th e Navy co mple tely.)

Figure 4

1

I

l

X-i S

x

X+i S

TIme Spent Developing

Line A represents the

extension oj the present as

a flat line into the fu ture. It is

the projection commonly used by people who, for one reason o r another, do not
wan t to ac knowledge ch ange.

Line B represents a projection from an

understanding oj the past. It looks back at

h ow things were (the time in terval depends on h ow go od the li ne-drawer's sense
of history is) , and exte nds fro m that point through the present. This is the ap
proach that uses " the voice of experience." In the Navy's case, this is the voice of
admi rals supported by experienced staff officers and civil servants .
Note that at time x +1 5 , t h e lines come somewhat close together i n this sec
tion of the curve (the mature portion of the industrialization curve, where the
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nation's institutions-including the Navy-and its citizens grew up) . In fact, at
x + 1 5 the "no change" line A is below the curve by about the same amount that
the "voice of experience" line B is above it. Regarding future needs , then, this
means that in a world of political discussion and compromise, in a time of ade
quate resources, the development agreed upon is probably very close to what
will actually be needed at year x+1 5 .
Now consider the b eginning portio n o f the new S-curve. This is the trans
industrial secti on-the part of the curve that applies to the current era. Again, sup
pose the Navy is at time x, and it wants to define how it must develop to execute
its missions (and thus survive and prosper) at time x + 1 5 , fiftee n years into the fu
ture (see Figure 5) .
Figure 5

1
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Line A again represents the extension of the present as a flat line into the fu ture.
At time x + 1 5 this line is furthest from the curve ; that is, A illustrates what is
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probably the most unrealistic approach in the definition of future needs . How
ever, because the nation has been in the flat, later portion of the industrializa tion
curve (the one it has grown to know and love) , the re is a tendency among some
to continue to use this app roach, especially since it seemed to work re asonably
well in the past (see Figure 4) .
Line B again represents a proj ection fro m an unders tan ding of the past. It looks
back at how things were (how far back depe nds on how good the line-drawer's
se nse of history is) , and draws from that point through the present. As the "voice
of exp erience" approach, it i s more realistic than li ne A, but it still misses the
curves in Figu res 4 and

5

at time

x + 1 5 . In the

mature industrial curve (Figure 4) ,

B misses the actual curve (re ality) on the high side-which is what Am erican
society and the Congress have for years been trying to tell the Navy. How
ever-and this is very significant-in the you ng trans-industrial curve (Fig
ure

5),

B misses the ac tual curve on the low side. T hat is, the " voice of

experience" approach now undershoots reality.
Line C represents a proj e c tion from an understanding of the present. This line is
tange nt to th e curve at time x, and is what the approach of the "futurists " * really
is. C is a more realistic approach than A or B, if the line is accurately drawn.
However, since not all "futurists " draw line C in exac tly the same way, how is the
Navy to know which one has drawn it correctly? It is excee dingly difficult fo r an
institution deeply rooted in the past to understand perfe c tly the realities of the
present .
Note th at in the young trans-industrial curve-- t he one the Navy dimly per
ceives and does not yet understand-all lines badly u ndershoot the curve at time

x + 1 5 . No prediction comes close eno ugh to future

re ality to make the Navy fe el

co mfo rtable about the way it will be going.
What can the Navy do? One impe rative is apparent: shorten the interval be
tween time

x

and the targeted future by quicke ning the Navy's organizational

perceptions and reactions. The Navy can then more accurately predict and de
fine, and more effe ctively meet, the requirem ents of the fu ture time .
For example, suppose the time interval for reorienting a N avy is thre e years ,
not fifte e n . t Eve n a succession of five ite rations of the worst pre dictor Oine A,
*

They would mo re appropriately be call e d " p resemis ts , " because they are extending the line ta ngem to the

present

into the future. Some critics cynically discoum the value of what futurists do. H owever, it is far better

to look ahead, try to form some vision o f future conditions, and b e ready to adjust quickly to new realities than
to divert one's glance from the future and focus myopic all y on the present. O ne 's visi on o f the fu ture can be
refined or re vised in response to change. The p rocess of anticip ation and revision is ceaseless, and any good
watch stander knows and practices it.
A notion preposterous t o minds still comfortably anchored on the matu re p orti on of the industrialization

t

learning curve.
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the flat line proj e c tion) , incorp o rating corre c tions every three years , gives at

x + 1 5 a res ult better than that of the best (q o f the lines in Figure 5 , proj ected
over the fifteen-year period as a whole (see Figure

6) .
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The moral of this story is that the Navy's c rystal b alls , c arefully polished over
many decades and carefully tuned to the old S-c u rve, are full of fog in the new
era. The Navy c annot see far en o u gh down the road it is now taking. The rate of
change is o u tstripping the Navy's ability to illuminate the way. That is why the
Navy-indeed, any organizatio n-that wishes to s urvive and prosper in the fu
ture must give p rimary emphasis to developing quickness.
Survival of the fittest is survival of the fleetest.
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Integrating New Te chnolo gy into the Fle et
There are three maj o r parts in the pro cess o f integrating new te chnology into
the flee t :
•

Research a nd development. Identifies promising technolo gie s a n d develops

applications of them to naval warfare .
•

Co ntracting, acqu isition, and ins tallatio n . (For the pur p o se s of this dis cussion,

includes associated logistics, maintenance, and mainte nance-related
training) . Produces the developed and tested applications and sees that
they are properly i nstalled and supported in the fleet .
•

Tactical integratio n of the new applica tion into naval warfare.

This process is too slow to accommo date rapidly evolving tech nologies . I t take s
years where it should take months (e. g. , the "ac celerated" Cooperative Enga ge 
ment Capability w a s conceptualized over te n years ago, a n d it i s j u st n o w being in
tegrated tactically) . I t takes decades where it should take years (e . g . , i t to o k twenty
years to move Aegis into the fleet, and then a few more years for the fleet to un
derstand how to use that system at its full capacity) .
Much mighty lab or and many long hours are required to make the process
move faster for exceptio nal projects-drawing effort from the ro utine proj ects,
whic h then slow even more. Not surprisingly, many people ardently seek to estab
lish their ow n proj e c ts as " excep ti onal " (even th ose th at are re ally routine) , in o r
der to make some progress. Result: the whole process clogs and slows dow n .
Fingers point, people s h o u t , and everyo ne works harder, but all are unable to make
the process work as well as they know it must-to day, but especi ally tomor row.
Who is at fault? No one. The system is at faul t. It was a great system, painfully de
veloped thro ugh much hard work by skilled and dedicated pe ople. H owever, it is
now an anal o g, series-connected, highly o rdered system in a digital , parallel
connected, disorderly wo rld . The Navy pays high salaries to some people to main
tain the system, to o thers to make it work, and to still o thers to subvert it. What the
Navy reall y needs to do is fix it .

Focus on Ti m e
"
A s discussed previously, data i s the lever needed t o move the Navy fro m the
Industrial Age to the trans-indus trial age, fro m the mature s e c tion of the old
learning curve to the young s e c tion of the new learning curve. The trans
industrial system, whi ch is based on rapidly applying rapidly developing new
..

Again, not merely questionable numbers, gathered as needed to decorate p oliti cal arguments, b u t credible ,

accurate , and m eaningful measurements related to issues of current import. Of course , data is a necessary b u t
insufficient t o o l :
use

the

it m u s t be u s e d i n conj unction w i t h the fulcrum

data effectively.

58

of mission-essential tasks a n d t h e wisdom to

Sailing New Seas
technologies, is focused on effectiveness and speed ("cycle time") of develop
ment and application. At the same time , institutions of the old, industrial system
find themselves i n economic trouble and the refore pay increasing attention to
efficiency as budgetary stresses and strains become intole rable .
By addre ssing the growing need for efficiency, the Navy thus has an excellent
opportunity, now, to move itself into the trans-industrial age . To make its case in
these times of eve r greate r budge t stress, the Navy has to ove rcome political ar
guments (rooted in the old system) with data-based arguments. "X marks the
spo t " at which data-based arguments will b e more effec tive than political argu
ments , and the Navy is near (or past) that spot (see Figure 7) .
Figure 7

p�uments

Budget Stress

..
�
----I

The trouble is tha t the Navy cannot use data-based arguments unless it has
data , something which it sorely needs . To marshal its arguments, the Navy must
emphasize time as the scarce resou rce and gather data on where time is being in
vested. Think on the following.
As the world moves into the trans-industrial age, time is becoming an ex
tremely scarce and precious resource . But j ust a little careful observation reveals
the fact that time is seldom thought of that way. It is poorly accounted fo r, and it
is assumed to be always available. Almost no one has more of it than anyone else
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doe s , and it is very difficult to buy more. Indeed, it is the one irreplaceable re
source , especially in c o mbat.
The proverb rings true : ti me is money-lots of money. Today's largest mone
tary exp enses are in wages and salary. For example, fewer workers are required on
shop floors; however, more (and b etter-paid) workers are required in the soft
ware and support activities that reduce the need for shop-floor workers , while
imp roving the quality of shop output. As demand for " kn owledge workers " in
creases, they become more expensive , and their time becomes more valu able.
The same c onsiderations, with minor changes of de tail, hold true for the De
partment of Defense and for the Navy.
Efficiency, the n , is absolutely critic al . In general terms, efficiency means ob
taining more useful output for a unit of input. I n more sp ecific terms relevant to
the present e ra , efficiency means getting more useful outp u t (increasingly
thought of in terms of useful

knowledge)

fro m each unit of time which has been

p urc hased from expe rt knowledge workers .
Thus the quantity " time" is a scarce resource in two ways:
•

Accelerating rates of technological development drastically redu ce cycle

•

The time of the knowledge worker is expensive. Scarce money means

time (elapsed clock and calendar time) , making it mu ch more critical.
scarce time .
Although time is money, i n the trans-industrial age time is increasingly a re
source more critical than money. M oney is becoming a mere abstraction fo r
time, so that giving up time to save money is not mu c h more than making a bad
bargain. For the Navy, be coming quicker (while keeping " qu ality" at least at
current levels) means getting more for its money.
More what? More output-more

useful output, that

is . Output is useful if i t

helps the Navy to reach i t s obj e c tives a n d to execute i t s missions. If not u seful,
the output is at best irrelevant, at wo rst harmful.

Mission Accomp lishment
To review: the task a t hand is to leve r the Navy fro m the I n dustrial Age to
the trans-indu strial age , using data-based arguments to increase the efficiency
and quickness with which it a c c o mplishes its missions. The task i nvolves seven
steps.
*

*

Although t h e following discussion refe� t o t h e highest command levels ,

seven steps can be done at

all

command levels, w ith approp ri ate adaptations.
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1.

Sta te the miss ions and objectives

<if the

Navy. This is a necessary action, but

not a sufficient one. That is: it is vital to state the missi o n , but i t is likewise vital to
*
plan the executi o n of the missi o n .

2 . Reexamine the m issions <if the Navy and restate them in operationa l terms .
This i nvolves defining how the Navy would go ab o u t executing its missions and
achieving its obj e c tives . No matter how the missions are restated, it is necessary
that the operatio nal statements include time standards. For example , suppose the
missio n is " take Lillipu tian Island by

1 5 June " ; the plan of action is the campaign

plan (time-phased acti ons and support) . If th e missio n canno t be sta ted with
such precision , it can be stated in more ge neral terms ; e . g. , " take a defended
mountain ous island in the Sea of Lopez within six we eks of initial actio n ." The
campaign plan can likewise b e expressed in general terms .

3 . Develop detailed process flow cha rts Jo r each mission and Jor each task oj each mis
sion . Again , time standards are essen tial and must b e specified for the comple tion
of every task on the charts . t
4. Determine the probability that each task will be do ne as planned. To calculate a
+
number reflecting the probabili ty that an obj ective or mi ssi on will be acc om
plishe d to a specified standard within a specified period, each detailed flow chart
must be set up as a probabili ties equation. For each step (task) in the equatio n ,
the probability o f achieving the standard fo r that step, within t h e time allowe d,
must b e determined. Time data relevant to a step can come from historical rec
o rds , direc t observation, automatic measurement, expert estimates, simulations ,
or models. The only requirement is that the time data be as accu rate as possi
ble-the quality of the data can be continually refined. The impo rtant thing is to
get started.

5.

Improve the likelihood that every process will achieve its o bjective within the

required time standards. Experts who fully understand a process or sub-process
*

Some years ago , many organizations spent a great deal of effo rt on the idea of " vision"-namely, the

vision of an organizati on, and how that vision is to be define d. This was an e xp ression of the intuitively (b u t
dimly) perceived need t o base effort and expenditu res on missions and obj e c tives. T h e discussions associated
with devel oping vision statements were usually quite accur ate and i nspired. However, most of the resulting
vision statements were flawed: the problem was that they were no t ope rational . They used impressive words
and were posted in elegant fo rmats , but the vision s tatements had little re al impact bec ause they had no
operational plans of action and milestones for accomplishing whatever missi ons were envisioned.
I n the mid- 1 990s there was c o ns iderable interest in "p rocess mapping" as a step in "B usiness Process

t

Reengineering. " And even before reengineering c ame into vogu e , flow-charting was one of the maj o r tools
of Total Quality Management. Both p rocess mapping and flow-c harting were central t o efforts made at
gaining real knowledge of the p rocesses by which a mission or objective is accomplished. The goal was
admirable, the too ls excellent, b u t the effo rts generally failed. The problem was misapplication (actually,
incomplete application) o f the tools: p ro c ess mapping and fl o w-charting were usu ally not integrated into a
plan of ac ti on related to an operational statemen t of the missi on.
+ The calc ulated number will n ot exp ress the actual probability. It will, h owever, reflect the probab ility;
thus, increasing the calculated number will in fact also increase the actual p robability.
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examine it closely and imp rove it. Those who are experts at each step (or sub
*

p rocess) in a p rocess examine that step to see if it can be acco mplished quicker,
cheaper, and/ or easier, while at least maintaining quality at current levels .

6.

Use time

as

a key measure of readiness. Specifically, use steps

4

and 5 to im

p rove the probabili ty of timely exe cution of each task and to i mprove continu
ally the readiness of a unit to execute each task quickly.
In view of the paramount importance of time, it is wise to measure readiness in
terms of time. In any dynamic, de
veloping environment-especially

In small opera tions, as in large, speed is the
essential element oj success.

in a combat e nvironment--speed

-General Geo rge S. Patto n , J r.

and quickness have an impact and
quality all their own . For a Navy

Speed is the essence oj war.

unit, readiness consists not only in

-Sun Tzu

being able simply to meet a stan
dard, but also in being able to meet it

as

quickly

as

possible. In fact, the speed with

which a standard is met can be more c ritical than the degree to which it is met.
Each task in the Universal Naval Task List (UNTL) is either already measured
in terms of time or can be measured in terms of time. Time measures are rela
tively easy to establish and understand. They can be highly accurate and c redible,
and are clearly meaningful to both combat op e rations and support .
7 . Conduct an inves tment analysis to determine where the Navy should put its

ef

fort and money to imp rove the probable 1fectiveness and the efficiency of each process. To
improve everything in a p rocess at one time is usually imp ractical and unafford
able as well as unwise. Thus, for the improvement of a given p rocess, the key is to
find the best place to pu t money and effort. A sensitivity analysis on the p rob
abilities equation associated with a p rocess does j ust that: it identifies the terms
that have the greatest impact on the result of the process. After it is determined
how much must be invested in each step to have the same degree of impact on
the result , the money and effort are spent where they will have the most i mpact.

Support
A focus on time is also c rucial in the management of all supporting activities,
including purely administrative tasks . The steps to realize gains in efficiency are
simple-but likely difficult, initiall/-and are greatly facilitated by available
methods of data collection, p rocessing, and analysis .
•

t

The experts are most often those who do the proc ess.
Initially difficult, bec ause different. In organizations a different task is initially a difficult task, no matter

how simple it really is .
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First, each s upport organization must institu tionalize a method that con tinuously
records and analyzes man-hour expenditures by individual, Junction, product or service,
and customer or objective. Ceaselessly monitoring the tre nd lines in every process
will flag problems ; track costs ; assist planning; and p rovide fresh, meaningful
info rmation necessary for improving efficiency.
Then support staffs must lead and manage to reduce time costs constantly. The
Navy's competitors are always i mproving; new applications of technology pose
new chall e nges; and c ompetitive cycle times are inexorably shrinking. Incessant
change brings with it an unending train of challenges and opportuni ties , neces
sitating continuous improvement in the Navy's deliverables, as well as steady re
duction of its costs . Process analysis to improve qJidency must be a continuous �ort,
not a one-shot ciffa ir.

§§§
There is no single recipe for i m
plementing a focus on ti me. All
Navy leaders can develop work
able , data-based methods for their
own o rganizations. Whatever the
specific

method, the

applied with vigor now is
better than a perfect solution ten minutes
later.
-General G e o rge S. Patton, Jr.

A good solution

important

thing is to Jocus on time in every command, department, divisio n , work c enter,
and office . The time to begin is Now. The techniques that a re devised can be re
fined or redesigned with exp e rience.

Refine the Req uirements Process
Problems
The requirements process today barely works ; it stumbles along, hobbled by
many problems. First, there is inadequate vision on which to base the definiti o n
of warfa re requirements . T h e Navy needs b e t t e r answers t o th e following ques
tio ns :
•

What i s i t that t h e Navy may be expected t o do ?

•

H ow quickly will the Navy have to do it?

•

H ow much is the country willi ng to pay-in the warfare currencies of
casualties, time, and destroyed e quipment-to do i t?

•

What is the plan for accomplishing the tasks?

63

The Neuport Papers

Compounding the problem of inadequate vision is th e fac t that requirements
are program-drive n instead of mission-driven; service -driven instead of j oint
drive n ; and, withi n the service, commu nity-driven instead of service-drive n .
Requirements inputs are focused o n specific procurement programs a n d warfare
co mmunities within th e services. Usu ally, the question that is actually addressed,
albeit implicidy, is "What do we want , and h ow can we j ustify i t by relating it to
j oint warfare ? "
Related t o this i s th e wo rrisome fa ct that inp u ts are poli tical rathe r than
data-bas ed. There appears to be little data supp ort , related to warfare , for
statements that this or that system (or number of systems) is or is n o t " c ritic al " ;
" required" ; " e ssential" ; " ce ntral " ; " needed" ; " adequate " ; " ready " ; " key" ; " fun
dam ental" ; " s ufficient " ; " efficient"; " robust" ; "vital" ; " minimum" ; etc.-so go es
the lexicon. Professional opinion is no substitute for data (particularly when profes
sional opinions differ) .
As to the definition of warfare requirements, component co mmanders are
currendy playing the wrong game. Comp onent commanders naturally have a
servic e fo cus, with close ties to service bu dge ting structures in the Pentago n .
T h u s they t e n d to concentrate on Pentago n currencies (programs , dollars) rath er
than warfare currencies (casualties, time, capital equipment, logistics, collate ral
damage) .
To top the list , the entire process for defining and filling warfare requirements
is much too slow for an era of rapid c hange. This problem is not addressed further
in this Newport Pape r, although it is ultimately th e military's-n ot just the
Navy's-most serious "warfare deficiency." The solution is well outside a fleet
commander's fe nce lines. Some program managers are al ert to this deficiency
and are trying to do something ab out it. Given the " rules of the game," they can
do only a litde at a time. Howeve r, it is u nlikely that incremental ch anges will be
enough. Correction of this problem is an entirely separate ball game.
So from wh at source can th e solutions come?
Not th e Department of Defense or the Joint Chiefs of S taff. Th ey do not h ave
knowledge of mission-oriented warfare requirem ents . M oreover, they are too
political, tainted with "inside-the-Beltway" concerns.
Not the Services. They do no t have knowl edge of mission-oriented j oint
warfare requirements. They may talk j oint, but th ey seldom u nderstand it or
kn ow how to begin to understand it. There is little interaction among compo
nent services on requirements issu es. Within the Services, the perspec tive of
each warfare community tends to be skewed by allegiances to favored programs .
Lastly, they als o are too politically interested.
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Not Congress . The p rimary ties of members of C o ngress are to their voting
co nstituencies . Most senators and representa tives lack expertise i n defense mat
ters , and they have a comple tely political bias , by design . Even their hired experts
are p olitically s kewed (els e they would not have been hired) . Nevertheless , many
members of Congress are aware of the military's p roblems .
O nly the combatant CINCs can solve the requirements problem. O nly they
have direct access to the warfare exp erts who h ave to exe c u te the missions in the
field. Only they and their subo rdinate JFCs are truly j oint. Only they and their
subordinate JFCs are the genuine warfighters . O nly the comb atan t CINCs s tand
a chance of being regarded as " honest bro kers " in Pentago n politic s .

Solutions
To define warfare requirements and fill them, the warflghters mus t focus on
the objectives they may be expected to achieve , as well as the asso ciated strategy,
campaign , missions, ta ctics, and tasks . These obj e c tives should not be limi ted to,
or eve n focus o n , exis ting war plans. The warfigh ters mus t also think i n terms of
warfare currencies : time, casualties , capital equipment, logis tics, and collateral
damage.
The Services and Department of Defense must convert the CINCs' warfare
requirements into resource requirements. They must also convert the warfare
currencies and resource re quirements i n to dollar equivalents for budge t pur
poses, then prioritize and reques t the res ources from Congress. The Se rvices
subsequently c o nvert the provided res o u rces into ready warfare capabilities
through research and development, procurement, man ning, maintenance, and
training.

How to Make the Solu tions Happen
The combatant CINCs mus t pursue two courses of action simultaneously.
One pertains to the definition of warfighting requireme n ts and the o ther to
combat support re quirements. Each course of ac tion c o nsists of several tasks .
Warfighting Requirements

1.

S tate the set of s trategic objec tives the un ifie d command will prepare to

achieve.
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2. Specify the campaigns the warfighters should prepare to execute in pur

suit of the strategic obj e c tives. If political sensitivi ties militate against specificity,
then formulate eac h campaign generically.

3 . For each campaign , specify the nature and size of the threats to be over
come and the assets to be assigned. Wherever possible, state the maximum allow
able costs in warfare currencies.
4. Specify j oint force commanders and subordinate component command

ers for each campaign. It is desirable but it may not be possible to identify the J FC
and component commanders who will actually be assigned the campaign . How
ever, each candidate JFC and compon ent commander should be involved in
planning at least one campaign.

5 . Task each J FC to work with associated compo nent commanders and de
velop a set of plans fo r each campaign . Each campaign plan should have an asso
ciated set of plausible alternatives. The campaign plans must be prioritized by
specific criteria, such as probability of success and costs in warfare cu rrencies .
"Gut guesses" by the J F C will have to suffice in the beginning, until there are
games and simulations that are accurate enough to be of some help.

6 . Task each JFC, assisted by the component commanders, to define the requirements for successful campaign execution:
•

Today.

•

Today, but at lower costs (again, in warfare currencies) .

•

In the future (CINC defines the time horizon for " the future ") . If the
time horizon is very far into the future, it will be quite difficult for the
JFCs to do this job, and they will need considerable help from more sen
ior staffs . The key to building an effective require ments system for an era
of rapid and radical change is to design it not to look far out into the
distant fu ture but to adj u st quickly to changes in the near future (see the
latter part of the previous section on the lear ning curve) .

•

In the future--s ame fu ture as ab ove-but at lower costs (warfare cur
rencies) .

Comb at Support Re q uirements

1.

·

Ta sk warfighters to specify the combat and combat support tasks , with

associated time standards, re quired or expected of each type of unit or group
vis-a-vis a certai n threat . Much of this j ob will have been done already in the
campaign plans .
•

Comb a t supp ort is primarily a service fun c tion and should pr ob ably con tinue that way .
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2 . Task the compon ent c o mmanders to measure unit readiness in each of
the combat and combat s upport tasks , and to repo rt their measure me nts to the
receiving ]FC when the u nits report fo r duty. (Current measure s are n o t ade
quate to this task and must b e redefined.)

3 . S upport tho s e inve stments re quested by the component co mmanders
(these are their combat supp o rt require ments) , j ustified by data-based argu
ments, that will:
•

Eith er improve the re adiness of units and groups to pe rform the speci
fied combat or combat support tasks . . .

•

O r enable units and groups to perfo rm the combat or combat support
tasks at lowe r costs (warfare currencies) .

§§§
Each combatant CINC collates both types of requirements, warfighting and
combat support; prioritizes them; and submits them as the I ntegrated Priori ty
Li st fo r the CINC's theate r.

How to Start
Start wi th the warfighting requirements rather than the combat support re 
quire ments. Pick one strategic obj e c tive, then pick one campaign (no t currently
in a war plan) in p ursuit of that objec tive. Choose one ]FC and o n e s e t of subor
dinate component commanders to be in charge of the campaign . O rder them to
develop o ne campaign plan and to formulate its associated set of warfigh ti ng re
quirements today ; to day, but at lower costs ; in the future ; in the future, but at
lower costs (see above) .
Evaluate the process. When satisfied wi th the proc ess , expand it to the entire
theater. Once that is do ne, apply the same rationale and p rocess to the definition
of combat support re quirements.
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ConcRusion� Haze Gray
and Underway
As stated from the ou tse t, this paper has been written to stimulate thinking,
discussion, and new approaches. It is not meant to be the "last word" on the mat
ters it presents; its rec ommendations are not prescriptive. Nonetheless , the issues
and recommendations treated here should be earnestly and seriously discussed,
not unquestioningly acc epted or summarily rej ected. Discussion should focus
not o nly on the Navy writ large, but also on the Navy writ small--e ach work
center, division, department, and command. What can Sailors do, locally and
within their areas of responsibility, to find out:
•

What should not be done that is being done?

•

What is not being done that should be done?

•

What is being do ne and should be done, but should be done better,
quicker, and cheaper, or by somebody else?

Furthermore , what can be done, locally, to find out where time and talent
are going, and whether they are being wasted or misused, and how to use them
more efficiently in operations and support? Efforts to answer these questions
and to implement the answers sh ould and can start now, everywhere in the
Navy.

A more important taskfor every level ojevery organization is to define a prioritized lis t

of its own particular missions and tasks, stated in operational and measurable terms.
When that has been done, the Navy can then answer the following questions
and give genuine focus to its efforts, as a whole and in its parts.
•

What are the specific implications of increased uncertainty for each or
ganization in the Navy, and what is the proper response?

•

Is decentralized command and control the way to go at all levels , in all
functions? Which levels, which functions?
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•

How and where should the Navy define the standards and training lev
els necessary to support decentralized command and control, and how
can the Navy accurately measure progress towards those standards?

•

Is a cruising force the way to go in the Navy-after-next? If not, why

•

Is the proposed re organization, or a versio n of it, the way to go ? If not,

not? If so, how?
why not? If so, how?
•

What does a primary focus on sea and area control portend for the next
Navy and th e Navy-after-next? What are the p ractical implications?

Lo ts of questions, but

Now is

the ti me to ac t,

Now is

the time to change. The

Navy canno t afford to wait fo r directions fro m "on high ." Those of us currently
at the peak of the Navy pyramid are the favorite childre n of old perspectives.
Admirals know and u nderstand those perspectives and the associated mecha
nisms and processes, as they must to e nsure that today's j obs are done. With
nearly eve ry day scheduled fro m su nrise to sunset, the Navy's flag officers co nse
quently find little time to develop new persp ec tives and new courses of actio n.
Perhaps it should n o t b e that way, but that is the way it is .

It makes no difference: at

this point there is no way of knowing exactly what the cor rect new courses will
be, no matter how brilliant the admirals or the members of their staffs .
Give n the ab ove co nditions, what the Navy needs is an interacting and
chemically reactive soup of diverse ideas i n every area of ac tivity wi thin the
Navy (see Appe ndix C, p.

85) .

New pe rspectives and courses will evolve fro m

the dynamic interplay a nd testing of these ideas in an open, decentralized, re
spo nsive , and unco nstrained (but gently refe reed) fo rum.
The N avy needs a better forum fo r ideas . One can be built on the Internet.
That j ob should b e done

now. Who

among us will do it?

The Navy needs a b etter, quicke r, and cheaper testing ground for new ideas.
One can b e built with simulators . That job should b e done

now

(not five years

from now) . Who among us will do it?
The crucial thing is not to temporize and s earch long and hard fo r perfectly
safe c ourses to steer, but to get underway now and make for sea. That will take
courage and the willingness to r isk scraping a few roc ks and shoals . After the
Navy is on course in the new seas , it will have to take fre quent fixes and adj ust
course as necessary. It has the tools fo r successful saili ng, and its history gives it
reason to sail confidently. And while the Navy and the next Navy are doing all
that needs to be done in the service of the nation, they must also design and
build the Navy-after-next--quickly.
Meanwhile, the clock keeps ticking, faster and faster . . . .
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The winds and waves are always on
the side of the ablest navigators.
-Edward Gibbon, Decline and Fall of the Roman Empire, 1 7 76

Appendices

Ap pendix A
F i g hti n g Pri n c i p l es

There are no new principles ifwar. However, dijferent principles should receive different
emphases in different environments. Some are especially appropriate to the Navy 's current
environment. This appendix highlights a few of those principles.

Fight humans, n o t just machin es. Machines do not ye t think in terms of
re turn on investment. Humans do. The less certain hu mans are of an outcome,
the less inclined they are to invest effort (or we alth , o r life , or time , o r reputatio n)
in its attainment. Unce rtainty deters action. I n c reasing the enemy's uncertainty
deters enemy action and thus buys mo re of the most pre cious commodity in
battle : time.
But heigh tening uncertainty does not always work ; and when it does not
work , it is time to take ac tion . Killing the enemy may be an option, but military
action that emphasizes killing is n o t always the most effec tive measure . For ex
ample, martyrs do not fear death , at le ast not until after they are committed, and
killing them usually breeds m o re martyrs . To be effective , fi nd out what the e n
emy treasures and take it away; or find out what the enemy fears or hates or de
spise s , and delive r it genero u sly. The aim is to fight min ds and will s . Defeating
the enemy's will obviates the nee d to fight the e nemy 's mac hines.
Expect surprise! Cu rrently, the United States Navy is the mos t p owerful
Navy in the world. Any enemy will plan to n e u tralize its p owe r thro ugh surprise.
To minimize surprise, the Navy s hould plan a variety of attacks against i ts own
fo rces. It is a go od exercise for j unior officers and will simultaneously help them
(and their commanders) to understand the enemy.
The best way to avoid being surprised by the enemy i s to s u rprise the enemy
first. However, the political situation o r the Rules of Engagement may n o t allow
naval fo rces to do that. The best way to accommodate surprise is to design and
train the Navy to be flexible and to react quic kly-very, ve ry q uickly, and mo re
quickly than any potential ene my.
Understand the enemy. Unde rstand the enemy 's obj ective s , treasu res, fears ,
strengths, and we aknesses. Anticipate the e nemy's e xploitatio n of one's own vul
nerabilities. The n use this knowledge and understanding to take what is
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treasured; give what is feared; turn the enemy's strength into a liability; attack the

enemy's weaknesses; and guard one's own vulnerabilities "

Use intelligence wisely. Intelligence can be a force multiplier; it can also be
an Achilles heel. Which one it is depends upon the effectiveness of e nemy coun
terintelligence. Understand that th e enemy will try to deceive sensors or deny
i nformation to them. Realize and accept that one's having been deceived or de
nied information re mains u nknown until the enemy is "at the gates ." The key
concern is no t how mu ch intelligence information is in one's possession, but
how reliable the information is and how many "warfare currencies" should be
bet o n it.

Counter the enemy's surveillance . Although there are times when the
enemy should know one's force is present and capable, it is never desirable that
the enemy know the exact location of all one's units or one 's precise intentions
(i . e . , one must be unpre di ctable) . That lack of knowledge engenders uncertainty
and may cause the enemy to increase surveillance efforts . Observa tion of the
enemy's surveillance wilJ reveal something of enemy intentions and cap abilities ,
and those are good t o know.
To maintain or even increase enemy uncertainty, the ene my's surveillance sys
te m must be neutralized. There are five ways to do this: destroy i t ; deceive it; del
uge it by flooding it with excessive information ; deny information to it; or
disconnect it fro m enemy fighting forces and control centers so that they do n o t
receive correct information.

Counter the enemy's targeting. If one is located by the enemy, one must
keep fro m being targeted by enemy weapons. The same five ways of countering
surveillance systems apply to countering targeting systems: destroy the weapons
platform; deceive the sensor; deluge the sensor with excessive data; deny infor
mation to the sensor; or disconnect the targeting sensor from the control s ur
faces of the weapo n .

Preplan responses. Preplanned responses enable a combat u nit to react
quickly and automatically to tactical conditions and do not require an order
from a senior commander. Do not confuse "intentions," whic h require imple
mentation orders , with " p replanned responses ," which do not.
•

Although respect is not necessarily prerequisite to u nderstanding, it

is wise to respect t he enemy, or at least

to respect what the enemy can d o . Given its present vantage of military and economic p reeminence , the
United S tates is often tempted to arrogance, dangerously blinding itself to its own sho rtcomings and to an
enemy 's strengths. It is extremely imprudent to assume that the enemy is inferior bec ause o f fewer numbers.
less weal t h , and " strange " culture and appearance. Moreover, American culture

is spread throughout the

w orld, and the United States is often the focus of the international media. I t is therefore likely that enemies of
the U . S . understand it better than the U . S . understa nds its enemies--a situation fra ught with d anger for U . S .
armed forces .
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Us e the offens e . The best defe nse is still a go od offense. However, a go od of
fense must overwh elm the critical targets. In quick, fast-moving warfare, enemy
decision makers and combat personnel are targets more critical than mere
equipment and facilities.
Know the danger curves. Kn ow which systems the enemy can bring to
bear, their range, and the tactics for their employmen t . As additional e nemy sys
tems pop ulate the battle space , they cause stepped discontin uities in o n e 's danger
curves. D efensive p osture and/or momentum of a ttac k must be increased upon
en tering the envelopes of opposing sys tems . In tran s-industrial warfare, ' kn ow
the danger c urves ' applies not only to weapons systems but also to enemy infor
mation systems and enemy manipulation of neutral information sys tems (e.g. ,
political forums and p ublic media) .
Use tough, simple, and workable tactics. Good engineering simplifies
operation. Similarly, good tactics simplify combat. Like goo d e nginee ring, how
ever, good tactical design is rare. Good ta ctics :
•

Are robust . They we ather s urprises and disappoin tme nt well .

•

Are simple, v e ry simple-in deed, extremely simple. They are easily
learned and re membered.

•

Rely on minimal, simple, tough , and fail-safe command, c ontrol , and

•

Are not pre dic table by the enemy.

•

D o not kill friends .

co mmunications.

Simplify, clarify, and shorten tactical instruction s . Complex tactical in
structions are seldom read carefully, if they are read at all . If read , they are seldom
understood in the same way by all . If un derstood, they are seldo m remembered
in de tail . If not carefully read, commonly u nderstood, and accurately re mem
bered, there is insufficient time in battle to review or clarify the m . And then it is
far too late.
Mind the arithme tic. Make sure there is enough materiel to support the tac
tics. Know the detection horizons and limitations---o n e's own and the enemy's.
Minimize the detection and engagement holes, or at least make them unpredictable.
Avoid the worst of all emissions control error s . The wo rst emissio ns
con trol error is to come out of the restricted emission condition too late.
Define the timeline s .
•

One 's own timeline: make i t shorter than expected t o effect surprise and

to deny the enemy b o th battle space and ti me.
•

The enemy timeline: len gth en it by all po ssible means to increase the bat

tle space and time available to one's own force s . I n trans-in dustrial war
fare, increasing the enemy's unce rtain ty does this best.
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Obvious, But Frequently Neglected Principles
Know and understand one 's capabilities.
Understand the tactics and exec ute them properly.
Know what one is talking about and how one will be understood .

One's own capabilities, tactics, and clarity of communication cannot be ade
quately known unless tested under real stress.
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Append ix B
Tactical Deve l o p m ent

Tactics are methods for using weapons to achieve a military objective. If opti
mized, those methods are force multipliers that are within the Navy's control; are
cheap to develop; and do not c hafe the political concerns of Congress or i ndus
try.
To be effective, however, tactics must be developed in a ti mely manner. The
current time-line for tac tical development and evaluatio n is too long i n a chang
ing world. It frequently takes over three years from the statement of the need for
a battle group tactic to the completed evaluation of a candi date tactic. Then
there are usually another few years to the inclusio n of the tactic in a Naval War
fare Publicati o n .
Ti meliness is n o t the only concern . Tactics m u s t be appropriate, executable,
and robust. Yet many of the tactics resulting from current processes do not mee[
those criteria. As a consequence, some are not held i n high regard and, in some
cases , are entirely ignored.
The Navy would therefore be wise to refo r m , quicke n , and improve its pro
cesses for developing tactics. By taking the time now--d uring this world " re
cess"-to perfect the ability to develop tactics quickly, the Navy will enable itself
to respond more agilely and effectively to the unknown dangers that will inevi
tably come its way in the future.
Alt h o u gh the N avy may to day have e n o u gh p owe r to c o u n t e r a ny c u r 
re n t e n emies w i t h c u r re n t t a c ti c s , a fo c u s o n t a c tical devel o p m e n t will e n 
able i t to a c c o mpli s h i t s m i s s i o n s a t lowe r c o s ts i n ti m e , c a s u alti e s , o pera ting
fu n d s , a n d c apital i nve s t m e n t-an d m o re i mp re s s ively a n d mo re thor
o ughly b e s i de s . S i mple a n d e ffe c tive tac t i c s will als o fa cili tate fas t e r a n d
c heape r trai n i n g , a n d re duc e dep e n d e n c e o n c o mman d a n d c o ntro l . By de
vel o p i n g a qui c k and e ffi c i e n t p ro c e s s for developi n g tac ti c s , the N avy will
be able to respo n d m o re promptly and effe c tively to tec hnologi c al i nn ova
tio n s (fo reign and do m e s ti c , fri e n d s ' and fo e s ' ) , new e n e m i e s , n ew e n e my
tacti c s , n ew situati o n s , an d n ew m i s si o n s (including t h o s e of p o t e n t ial e n e 
mies) .
Lastly, an emphasis on tactical development will enhance the fighting ability
and the morale of Navy personnel involved in the process.
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What Should Be Done
As things now stand, the responsibilities for tac tical development, evaluation ,
and training are fragmented among many commands . Although the curre nt sys
tem works fairly well for u nit tactics, it is ge nerally inadequate for the rapid de
velopment and evaluatio n of group (multi-platform) and joint (multi-service)
tac tics . The following actions will facilitate quicker and bette r development of
group and joint tactics .

1. Reconstitute the Naval Doctrine Command as the Fleet Tactics and
Doctrine Cente r ; subordinate i t to CINCLANTFLT (in today's Navy structure) ,
and give it responsibility for overseeing and coordinating all efforts in tactical devel
opment. Although the development and evaluation of multi-platform and multi
service tactics are its primary concerns , the Center also oversees the development
and evaluation of platform tactics by SWDG, SUBDEVRONs, VXs , OPTEVFOR,
and NSAWC.

2. Fleet Tactics and Doctrine Center establish Tactical D evelopment
Teams (see below) .

3 . Numbered fleet commande rs forward to Fleet Tactics and D octrine
Center all fleet requirements for tactical development.

4.

Fleet Tactics and Doctrine Center dire ct each request for the develop

ment of a group and/ o r j oint tactic to the appropriate Tactical Development
Team.

5 . Fleet Tactics and Doctrine Cente r respond to all tactical development
requirements by providing an evaluated tactic to the requesting command in: less
than a year by 1 January 1 999 ; less than six months by 1 January 2000; less than
three months by 1 January 200 1 ; and mo re quickly thereafter. These timelines
will necessitate the use of computer simulations.

6.

Fleet Tactics and Doctrine Center distribute tactics and updates elec

tro nically, keeping electronic tactical publications within 3 , 500 words (not in
cluding graphs , tables , and ill u strations) .
7 . Fleet Tactics and D octrine Center use uniformed personnel and civil
servants , and representatives from the Center for Naval Analyses and non
competing universi ty lab o ratories, to evaluate tactics.
8 . Move (eventually) the Fleet Tactics and Doctrine Cente r and all tactical
development and evaluatio n effo rt to the functional commander fo r Fleet
Training and D octrine Command subo rdinate to COMNAVUSA.
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Tactical Development Teams
Each Tactical Development Team is composed mostly of uniformed per
sonnel. They are the ones who bleed, and so have a vested interest in quality
tactics. It is also good training for them to think about tactics, and it enhances
their p rofessional development. Finally, uniformed personnel generally like to
think about tactics, but currently have little opportunity or encouragement to
do so. *
The Fleet Tactics and Doctrine Center identifies a cadre of uniformed tacti
cal specialists and ensures that their expertise is recognized and put to use in the
development of tactics. This requires procedures to:
• Identify uniformed tactical experts in various warfare areas, wherever
they are in the Navy
•
Organize them into Tactical Development Teams
• Link them together in an electronic network
• Enable these dispersed but electronically netted tactical experts to work
together as teams

Evaluation
Professional analysts and evaluators are to evaluate (not develop) tactics. There
are professionals within the Navy establishment (Warfare Centers, Center for
Naval Analyses, and university labs contracted to the Navy) that can help in the
evaluation of tactics , although that is not within their present tasking.

Use of Contractors
Tactics should not be developed by contractors. Contractors, despite being
professional and dedicated, are more expensive than uniformed personnel and
tend to be less up-to-date on naval operations and tactical requirements. Moreo
ver, contractors do not have to put developed tactics into practice.
Contracting and review procedures, and the defacto requirement for contrac
tors to think in terms of deliverable products, staffing considerations, and busi
ness considerations, slow the tactical development and evaluation process. If
necessary, contractors can be used for administration, formatting, and publishing
*

And

that is the Na vy 's fault, not theirs.
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of tac tical documents (although this too can probably be done within the Navy
establis hme nt) .
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Appe n d ix C
Complexity Theory

This is a much abbreviated discussion o f some aspects o f complexity theory
and how those aspects of the theory apply to what the Navy must do between
now and the Navy-after-next. I ts contents are gleaned from or inspired by the
6
writings of M. Mitchell Waldrop and Stuart Kauffman.

Order, Chaos, and Complexity
Systems can exhibit two extremes of structure: order and c haos. An excep
tionally ordered system has litde interaction among its elements. There is litde
flexibility within it. It does what its structure allows , and no more . It does not in
teract constructively with new systems, and therefore it neither learns nor
evolves. I t tends to be rigid. It is Stalinist.
A chaotic system has the opposite problem . It has few s tandards. It lacks the
minimum levels of stability that are needed to maintain and nurture a learning
system. I t constandy reacts and seldom integrates. I ts lack of structure allows eve
rything, and therefore nothing evolves beyond its current state. It tends to be ut
terly fluid and turbulent. It is Bosnian.
In between these two extremes, at a kind of murky, turbid phase transition
called " th e edge of chaos," there is complexity. In this phase transition the ele
ments of the system never quite lock into place, yet never quite dissolve into tur
bulence, either. This system is both stable enough to store information and active
7
enough to transmit it. It is American.
Complex systems on the edge of chaos can self-organize to react to their en
vironment. To attain the levels of spon taneity and adaptation necessary for self
organization, they must be highly i nteractive with other related systems (no
stovepipes allowed) , and very quick to absorb, i ntegrate, and change. The United
States has developed such a system to manage its society; the Navy has developed
such a system to manage an active flight deck (see pages 22-25) . It is the Navy's
task to develop a similarly flat, adaptive, and agile system to manage a successful
(which means, rapidly evolving) Navy in the edge-of-chaos situation it faces i n
t h e trans-industrial world.
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Coevolution
Found in the region between order and chaos, coevolution is a process in
which two or more related p rocesses support each other in ways that cannot be
foreseen before they begin to interact. I t is somewhat diffe rent fro m random se
lection and survival of the fittest .
For example , the invention of the internal combustion engine led to the inven
8
tion of the automobile, which began life as a rich gentleman's toy. D evelopment
of the automobile led to development of gas stations, better roads , motels , etc . ,
which in turn encouraged more people to buy automobiles. The growing
population of owners and operators of automobiles began to live farther fro m
work, m e e t people in distant towns, a n d distribute p roduc ts more rapidly and ef
fi ciently. Tire and rubber industries expanded, and petroleum by-p roducts fed
the development of the chemical industries. B etter steels and metals were devel
oped, engineering skills were honed and polished, and all was done quicker,
c h eap er, and better than was p ossible a few years earlier.
Demand fed competition . Competition fueled the growth of the skills and re
sources that were applied to further develop ment of the internal combustion en
gine, constantly improving it. This process unleashed an avalanche of applications ,
which in tu rn accelerated the rate o f development o f the engine and o f the related
industries it spawned. New applications spawned whole new industries in turn.
Each development fed the others in ways totally unimaginable to the inventors
and early p roducers of the internal combustion engine and the automobile.
Simultaneously, the internal c o mbustion engine and the au tomobile pushed
the horse out of its central position in society. The new drove out the old. Out
went blacksmiths , saddle makers, stables, carriages, and harness shops . In a rever
sal of the former order, the horse became the gentleman's toy and the car be
came a family and social n e cessity.

§§§
As with the inte rnal c o mbustion engine and the automobile, so too with the
Navy and its environment. No one knows, and no one can know, what Navy
will be needed in the foggy distant future . What is apparent is that the nation
must have a Navy that will rapidly interact-coevolve--w ith its changing e nvi
ronment. To build a Navy that thrives at th e edge of chaos , some of the c harac
teristics of complexity must first be considered :
•

Of

course, this paragraph also applies to the Department of Defense, to the other Arme d Services

separately, and to

all the Anned

Services jointly.
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Uncertainty
Uncertainty is a fac t of existence in the complex region b e twee n order and
chaos. However, it is not the paralyzing uncertai n ty of chaos . As illus trated by the
coevolution of the internal combustion engine and the auto mobile, new ena
bli ng ideas grow from new or freshly fertilized fields , and lead to o ther com
pletely unexpected ideas in an avalanche of change that no thing can escape.
The Navy is now swept up in the avalanche of change tha t was i ni tiated, at
some unheralded and quiet moment, by the development of silic on chips and
the compute r. The implications of new tec hnologies and rapid change are pro
found and enge nder uncertainties that cause severe disquiet and unease. The
Navy is tempted to cling to the security blan ket of i ts successful p ast, but that sort
of c ringing-however comforting-will not take it safely through the future ,
which is arriving now.
I t is up to the Navy to learn , now, how to ride the avalanc he of c hange. It must
continually and quickly adapt. The consequences of the actions it takes, and
whether they will succeed, cannot b e known. Nonetheless, it is plain that a fixa
tion on the past will not help the Navy. It is a fac t that if the Navy does not act, i t
will not succeed.
What actions will help the Navy succeed? In an avalanche of rapid change ,
c rystal ball s looking far into the future are inevitably cloudy. Thus the best the
Navy can do is b e "locally wise," observing simple decision rule s , and gathering
9
(and digesting) relevant information to help execute its decisions wisely.

The Elements of Success
Simpl e Decision Rul es, Locally Applied
o r,

What the Navy Can Learn from "Boids"
Birds are not very intelligent animals ; they can resp ond to only the simplest of
rules. Nevertheless, birds flock, and as a flock they move elegantly and smoothly
in c omplex environments . If the directions for floc king, and for moving as a
flock, were transmitted from the leader to each of the members , the leader and
the members of the flock would require an elab orate c ommunications system
and considerable processing p ower. But birds have neither. How do they do it?
In the late 1 980s, a gentleman by the name of Craig Reynolds developed a
computer flock of " b oids." His flock "flew" beautifully, but it was not built and
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led by a leader from the top down . Rather, it was built from the bottom up, in a
scheme in which each boid followed three simple rules of behavior, described by
Waldrop as follows:

1.

10

Maintain a minimum distance fro m other obj ects in the environment,
including other boids .

2 . Match velocities with nearby boids .

3. Move toward the perceived center o f mass o f th e group o f nearby boids.
None of the rules was "form a floc k," which would have been too hard for a
bird/boid to execu te. The rules were entirely local, referring only to what a boid
could see and do in its own vicinity. The flock formed "from the b ottom up."
The b oids were able to fly as a flock in a co mplex environment (from a b oid's
perspective) through:
•

Simple decision rules

•

Loc ally available information

The

same formula

works for more intelligent entities in much more complex

enviro nments, even those that threaten to overwhelm their inhabitants. By apply
ing simple decision rules on the basis of information made available to it, the Navy
can flourish in the complexity of its environment while continuing to learn and
adapt.

Diversity
The more ideas the Navy has available to it, the more interactio n , stimulation,
and coevolution is possible. The more stru cture the Navy has, th e fewer the ideas
the Navy ge ts. An intricate system of stovepipes and bureau cracies (such as the
present structu re of the Navy) tends to quash ideas and stifle crea tive thought.
Too much structu re leads to a highly o rdered regime that tends also to be slower,
less agile, and less flexible than a less ordered regime.
To open th e flo odgates that are holding back ideas, the Navy must:
•

Reduce its struc ture

•

Flatten its structure

•

Minimize individual risk

•

Reward ideas

Reactivity
I deas that do not interact cannot coevolve. For coevolution to occur,
diversity of ideas must be catalyzed by communication (diversity wi thout
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co mmunicatio n among vario us eleme nts is merely divisive and co unterproduc
tive) . Modern te chnology fosters extensive and pervasive c ommunicati o n and
thus makes possible flat organizati ons that dep end upo n and encourage such
communi cation .
A high degree of reactivity-the rate and i ntensity of i nteractio n between the
various components of a mixture (any mixture, whether c hemical, biological, or
social)-must be sustained in the soup of diversi ty long enough to establish a
co urse of development. The greater the reactivi ty, the shorter the time needed
fo r interaction to evolve a new co urse (i . e. , more options can be explored in less
time) .

87

Ap pend ix D
Acronyms

3M

Ships' Maintenance a n d Material Management

ACU

Assault Craft Unit

C41

Command, Control , Communications , Compu ters ,

CB

Naval Construction Battalion

CENTCOM

United S tates Cen tral Command

and Intelli ge nce

Commander-in-Chief. In this doc ument, the term

CINC

evolves solely to denote a comb atant co mmander
in-chief.
CINCLANTFLT
CINCLANTFLT next
CINCPACFLT
CINCPACFLT nex.t

Commander-in-Chief, Atlantic Fleet

·

Commander-in-Chief, U. S. Atlantic Fleet, next Navy
Co mmander-in-Chief, Pacific Fle et

·

Commander-in-Chief, U. S . Pacific Fl eet, next Navy

CINCUSNAVEVR

Commander-in-Chief, Naval Forces Europe

CJC S

Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff

·
COMNAVAIRFOR
·
C OMNAVSUBFOR
·
COMNAVSVRF OR
CO MNAVSVRFPAC
·
COMNAVUSA

Commander, Naval Air Forc e
Commander, Submarine Force
·

Commander, Naval Surface Force
Commander, Naval Surface Force, Pacific
Commander, Naval Forces in the United S tates

COMS OLANT

Commander, South Atlantic Force

CONUS

Continental Uni te d States

CV

aircraft carrier

CVN

aircraft car rier, nuclear powe r

EOD

explosive ordnance disposal

EUCOM

Unite d S tates Europ ean Command

FISC

Fleet and Industrial Supply Center

FMB

Financial Management B udget

FTSC

Fleet Techni cal Support Center

JFC

Joint Force Commander

LAN

local area network

MD SU

Mobile Diving and Salvage Unit

•

Term pertains to notional organizations described in this pamphlet.
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MOOTW

military operations other than war

MPA

maritime pa trol aircraft

MSTS

Military Sea Transportation Service (formerly MSC)

N8

Deputy Chief of Naval Operations for Resources,
Warfare Requirements , and Assessment

NAVD OC

Naval Doctrine Command

NCA

National Command Authorities

NFC

Numbered Fleet Commander

NSAP

Navy Science Assistance Program

NSAWC

Naval Strike and Air Warfare Cente r

NWAD Corona

Naval Warfare Ass essment Division , Corona, Califor
ma

OPNAV

Office of the Chief of Naval Op erations

OPTEVFOR

Operational Test and Evaluation Forces

PACOM

United States Pacific Command

SEAL team

sea-air-land team; a naval force specially organized,
trained, and equipped to condu ct special operations
in maritime, littoral , and rive rine environments.

SOUTHCOM

United States Southern Command

STRATCOM

Strategic Command

SUBDEVRON

Submarine D evelopment S quadron

SWDG

Surface Warfare Developmen t Group

UAV

unmanned aerial vehicle

UNTL

Universal Naval Task List

USACOM

United States Atlantic Command

VX

Navy Air Develop ment Squadron; Air Test and Eval
uation Squadron

WAN

wide-area nerwork

WMD

weapon(s) of mass destruction
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